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Concern about “secret diplomacy” in the wake of World War I found its clearest 
expression in opposition to “secret treaties.” Left-leaning and internationalist groups believed 
that “publicity” of treaties1 would advance the control of foreign policy by legislatures and 
citizens, and help construct a more peaceful international order, governed by law rather than 
power politics. Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations gave expression to these 
ideals, by purporting to render the binding force of treaties entered into by any member of the 
League conditional on their registration by the League Secretariat. Registration in turn entailed 
publication to the world at large.2 Article 18 was thus the first instantiation of a norm of treaty 
publication in international law (with “treaty” here understood in the general international law 
sense).3 Admittedly, this norm was a relatively narrow one. It guaranteed only the publication of 
treaties once made, and did not address the secrecy of the negotiation phase. Nevertheless, it was 
a major change to law and diplomatic practice. Aspects of Article 18 were carried over into 
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1 “Publicity” is the term prevailing in the early twentieth century for what would today be captured by 
“transparency.” 
2 Article 18 read: “Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the 
League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such 
treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.”  
3 As will become clear, the definition of “treaty” is crucial to the developments traced here. Unless otherwise 
indicated, my use reflects the scope of the term as now defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), opened for signature May 22, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331: a written agreement between states, governed by 
international law. This is distinct from the meaning of “treaty” and “traité” in, for example, the U.S. and French 
Constitutions.  
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Article 102 of the UN Charter, which in turn was echoed in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT).4 
This article offers the first detailed history of the norm of treaty publication. It traces the 
emergence of the norm, and struggles over its interpretation and application, through the practice 
of the United States, Britain, and France. While these three states are not representative of the 
international community as a whole (neither in the interwar period nor today), their commitment 
to greater publicity, and influence over modes of diplomacy, makes them a revealing lens on the 
norm and its limits. The article draws on public debates in legislatures, international 
organizations, and legal scholarship, but also discussions within foreign ministries and the 
League of Nations Secretariat. Analysis from these diverse sources offers a clearer picture of the 
true legal architecture of publicity and secrecy in treaty practice. It suggests how, and why, 
margins for secrecy have persisted, even in liberal democracies, and draws out for critical 
scrutiny the relationship between the norm of treaty publication and legality in the international 
order.  
The article challenges the liberal democratic trajectory some might expect, namely ever-
greater publicity over time. It shows that, while statesmen and officials made real efforts to 
uphold the publication norm, they also fought to preserve some avenue for making commitments 
that were both legally binding and secret. In international law, the radical potential of Article 18 
of the Covenant—the connection it forged between registration and publication, on one hand, 
and binding force, on the other—was undone in the early years of the League. Article 102 of the 
Charter is less ambitious than its predecessor. Domestic law requirements, which arguably play 
as great a role in driving publication as international requirements, have also left avenues for 
secrecy, although these have been narrowed and systematized.  
Within liberal democracies, the article shows that general attitudes to the norm of 
publication were driven not only by factors like perceived geopolitical vulnerability, but also 
national political and legal cultures, and even the bureaucratic organization of the treaty 
apparatus. Specific efforts to carve out exceptions to the norm of publication, or decisions to 
flout it, were motivated by diverse considerations: perceived needs to preserve some concrete 																																																								
4 Id. Art. 80. By the time of the drafting of the Vienna Convention, the relevant article was considered to be 
codifying a customary requirement. See Pierre Klein, Article 80: Registration and Publication of Treaties, in 2 THE 
VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, 1797, 1798–99 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein 
eds., 2011). 
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advantage over military or commercial rivals, to stabilize markets or currencies, and to prevent 
political opposition from national populations, colonies, or allies; but also to conceal markers of 
inferiority or subordination in interstate relations, and thus shore up a symbolic economy of 
interstate equality. For bodies charged with upholding the norm, like the League Secretariat, 
maintaining the force of Article 18 was important for credibility with internationalist 
constituencies, but there were countervailing incentives to interpret the provision narrowly in 
order to avoid confronting—and being seen to be defeated by—powerful member states.  
Many motivations for secrecy on the part of governments and institutions were self-
interested and instrumental. However, officials and reformists also thought about secrecy in 
principled terms. On occasion, they reconsidered the normative case against secrecy that had 
been seen as persuasive in 1919. Some came to doubt whether secrecy was always inimical, for 
example, to peaceful ordering. In some instances, it seemed vital to preserve peaceful relations.  
The doubts of contemporaries suggest enduring questions about whether and how the 
norm of treaty publication favors ends like democracy, peace, and legality.5 This article probes, 
in particular, the relationship between publicity and legality in the international order. In doing 
so, it gives a sense of the complex empirical terrain in which questions about democracy and 
peace, too, would have to be pursued.  
Actors concerned with publicity articulated different dimensions of the relationship 
between publicity and legality. Simplified for the sake of analysis, much of the discussion about 
publicity posited, first, a basic conceptual or normative connection to legality. This could take 
the form of assertions that legal relations and obligations were inherently public, or that they 
ought to be public. Second, there was an expectation that the norm of treaty publication would 
strengthen the role of law in the international order more generally (for example, by improving 
the dissemination and coherence of the law itself, fostering a commitment on the part of 
governments to following the law, or levelling out power imbalances between states and 
vindicating sovereign equality). This combined a general normative sensibility with a number of 
very condensed assumptions about the effects of publication or secrecy in particular contexts. 
Finally, there was confidence in law as a means of entrenching the norm of publication. This 
																																																								
5 For a recent defense of limited secrecy in international commitments, both legal and political, see, e.g., Ashley 
S. Deeks, A (Qualified) Defense of Secret Agreements, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713 (2017). 
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article shows that each of these stylized dimensions of the relationship between publicity and 
legality proved more complex—empirically and conceptually—than it had seemed in 1919.  
The article intersects with doctrinal scholarship on the law of treaties and emergent 
research on why states craft interstate commitments in particular ways. However, doctrinal 
scholarship—cited very sparingly here—often concentrates on problems of classification, like 
the definition of a treaty6 and distinctions between legally binding “treaties” and “gentlemen’s” 
or “non-binding” agreements;7 or on questions which flow from classification of texts, like the 
role of ancillary texts in interpretation.8 By contrast, emergent research on why states make 
agreements in the form they do largely brackets these questions.9 This article puts the law at the 
heart of the inquiry. Unlike doctrinal scholarship, though, it is not aimed at reaching its own 
classification of the texts considered. Rather, it probes what interlocutors understood themselves 
to be doing in drafting or handling texts in particular ways.  
Attention to these features of treaty practice, often side-lined in doctrinal accounts, gives 
a much richer picture of the true architecture of publicity and secrecy. It reveals the possibilities 
created by the interplay of the law of treaties with diplomatic crafts of drafting, and the 
management of texts within foreign ministry bureaucracies. It suggests a more expansive canvas 
for states crafting their commitments than can be captured in many studies of state behavior. 
Governments are not only choosing between treaties and non-binding agreements, for example, 
but crafting complexes of different texts, making choices about presentation and emphasis which 
are difficult to capture in quantitative ways. Officials are sometimes uncertain about the status of 																																																								
6 See, e.g., Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Identification and Character of Treaties and Treaty Obligations Between 
States in International Law, 73 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 141 (2003). 
7 See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, A Mirage in the Sand? Distinguishing Binding and Non-binding Relations 
Between States, 10 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 223 (1997); JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF A TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1996); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 46–49 (3d ed. 2013); Jan Klabbers, Not Re-
visiting the Concept of Treaty, in 40 YEARS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 29 (Alexander 
Orakhelashvili & Sarah Williams eds., 2010). 
8  See, e.g., Paul Reuter, Traités et transactions. Reflexions sur l’identification de certains engagements 
conventionnels, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL À L’HEURE DE SA CODIFICATION. ÉTUDES EN L’HONNEUR DE ROBERTO 
AGO I, 399 (1987). What I call “ancillary texts” are texts which, taken together with a primary text, form a sort of 
transactional package, although their relation to the primary text may be ambiguous. They may be, but are not 
necessarily, part of the travaux préparatoires, or analyzed as “interpretive declarations” or “understandings.”  
9 See, e.g., Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L ORG. 495 (1991); 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); 
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AJIL 581 (2005). For analyses which grapple 
with law and politics together, see, e.g., SURABHI RANGANATHAN, STRATEGICALLY CREATED TREATY CONFLICTS 
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014); GRÉGOIRE MALLARD, FALLOUT: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN AN 
AGE OF GLOBAL FRACTURE (2014). 
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particular texts, in disagreement with each other, or consciously shaping textual forms to 
preserve ambiguity about legal status. Finally, close attention to the crafting of texts and the 
negotiation of the bounds of the category of treaty brings to the fore some paradoxical aspects of 
secrecy in the international legal order. Secret treaties, by their nature, will never enjoy many 
avenues for rhetorical or institutional enforcement typically associated with legally binding 
commitments. They might even thus reflect a faith in legal obligation alone to shape state 
behavior. Conversely, however, some secret treaties purport to commit states to actions which 
may violate international law, calling broader commitments to legality into question.  
The article begins with a brief overview of the pre-World War I (WWI) landscape (Part 
I). It then traces the emergence of Article 18, and the tacit qualification of this provision in the 
early years of the League’s existence (Part II), before addressing interwar confrontations with a 
comprehensive publication norm in national public law and practice (Part III). While interwar 
developments are considered in detail, as they shaped approaches taken after World War II 
(WWII), the treatment of national practice is necessarily selective, focusing on examples which 
illustrate the range of areas in which secrecy was sought, the repertoire of techniques used, and 
particular turning points in national approaches. The article then considers the transformation of 
the treaty publication norm after WWII, a period for which the archival material becomes scarcer 
(Part IV). It sketches the evolution of techniques of secrecy, and changing legal approaches to its 
management, from WWII to the present (Part V), before offering a snapshot of the secret treaty 
today (Part VI). Finally, it summarizes developments over the last century, and what they reveal 
about the empirical landscape in which to consider the relationship of publicity to democracy, 
peace and legality in future (Part VII).  
 
I. SECRET TREATIES ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR I 	
Prior to WWI, the secret treaty was a recognized, if criticized, legal instrument. 
International law imposed no requirement that treaties be published. Such a requirement, if it 
existed at all, stemmed from national laws or practices concerning legislative knowledge or 
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approval of treaties. There was no consensus on whether a failure to adhere to domestic law 
respecting treaty-making affected the validity of a treaty under international law.10  
Of the three states examined here, the United States was the only one with an ostensibly 
comprehensive requirement for legislative approval prior to ratification, in the form of the 
requirement for Senate advice and consent for all “treaties” within the meaning of Article II of 
the Constitution. Once ratified, at least, these texts would be published. Yet, as is well-known, 
U.S. practice recognized a range of “executive agreements” made without Senate advice and 
consent.11 While most executive agreements were published in one form or another,12 some did 
remain secret, and it was therefore possible to make secret, and legally binding, agreements. 
However, scholars in the early twentieth century included in lists of “executive agreements” a 
number of “gentleman’s agreements” or “diplomatic agreements” which they considered binding 
only on the president who made them (and successors, if they did not repudiate the agreements), 
rather than on the state.13 Some of the more notorious instances of secret texts fell within this 
category, including the 1907–08 “gentleman’s agreement,” under which the Japanese 
Government would limit Japanese migration to the United States.14 The “secret treaty” in the 
sense of a text that was both unambiguously binding on the state under international law, and 
secret, was therefore marginal to U.S. practice, if it was used at all. 
In Britain, the Crown alone had the authority to make and ratify treaties. If a treaty was 
not of a nature to require any immediate change in the existing law, or further legislative steps 																																																								
10 See, e.g., Charles Cheney Hyde, Agreements of the United States Other Than Treaties, 17 GREEN BAG 229, 
229 (1905); L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 536–37 (1905); and scholarship summarized in 
LOUIS MICHON, LES TRAITÉS INTERNATIONAUX DEVANT LES CHAMBRES 416–20 (1901).  
11 Constitutional authority for which was grounded in, for example, powers delegated by Congress to make 
agreements on certain matters; or the president’s own powers (as commander in chief, as the sole organ of foreign 
negotiation, etc.). See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 10; John Bassett Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 POL. 
SCI. Q. 385 (1905); SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 102–40 (2d ed. 1916). 
12 The Statutes at Large were intended to contain “agreements” as well as treaties made with Senate advice and 
consent. Printing Act of 1895, ch. 23, 53d Cong., §73, 28 Stat. 601. 
13 See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Control of the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Relative Rights, 
Duties, and Responsibilities of the President, of the Senate and the House, and of the Judiciary, in Theory and in 
Practice, 60 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 99, 323, 331 (1921); William Hays Simpson, Legal Aspects of Executive 
Agreements, 24 IOWA L. REV. 67, 78 (1938).  
14 This “agreement” was in fact contained in a long series of diplomatic correspondence: see subsequent 
discussion in Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara), 
Mar. 27, 1924, in 2 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1924, at 337–38 (1939). 
The American government had initially wished the agreement to be a Senate-approved treaty, but this would have 
exposed the Japanese government to domestic criticism for surrendering rights under an earlier treaty, and 
acquiescing to racially-driven resentment. RAYMOND A. ESTHUS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND JAPAN 158–64 
(1967). The agreement did ultimately operate beyond the terms in office of the parties to the correspondence. 
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for its implementation, there was no requirement that its existence be disclosed to the Parliament 
or to the public at large. Treaties were customarily published as parliamentary papers, but this 
publication was not required by law. Accordingly, secret treaties were a feature of British 
practice, although they were used relatively sparingly.15 
In France, the president of the Republic, empowered to negotiate and ratify treaties, was 
required to “give information of their contents” to the legislature “[a]s soon as the interest and 
safety of the State shall permit.”16 This language, taken alone, permitted indefinite secrecy of 
treaties once made, unless they required promulgation in order to function in domestic law, or 
entailed legislation for their implementation. However, as in many other Continental European 
constitutions, certain treaties (“of peace, of commerce, . . . which involve the finances of the 
State, … which refer to the condition of persons, [or] to the rights of property of Frenchmen in 
foreign countries”) were “not final” until voted on by the two Chambres, and no cession, 
exchange, or annexation of territory could take place except by virtue of a law.17 This required 
certain categories of treaty to be laid before the legislature and thus subjected to formal or de 
facto publicity. At the same time, many of the most consequential “political” treaties, particularly 
treaties of alliance, were generally not considered to fall within the categories requiring 
legislative approval, and could thus be kept secret until “the interest and safety of the State . . . 
permit[ted]” their communication.18  
Although national law and practice sometimes used “treaty” in a narrow sense, and made 
distinctions between different types of treaties, the orthodox doctrinal position under 
international law was, by WWI, that there was a single juridical category of treaty:  
 
International compacts which take the form of written contracts are sometimes termed not 
only agreements or treaties, but acts, declarations, protocols, and the like. But there is no 
																																																								
15 An 1878 British Foreign Office (FO) memorandum lists only ten or so instances of secret treaties of alliance 
concluded by Britain since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Oakes, Instances in Which Great Britain Has 
Been Party to Secret Treaties of Alliance, Subsidy, FO 881/3665 (July 12, 1878). There were, however, further 
secret treaties other than alliances. 
16 Loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet 1875 sur les rapports des pouvoirs publics, Art. 8, as translated in HENRY 
C. LOCKWOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF FRANCE 406, 407 (1890). 
17 Id. 
18 Albert Dauzat, La Convention et les traités secrets, LXXII REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 371, 379 
(1912); Gaston Jèze, Le Pouvoir de conclure les traités internationaux, et les traités secrets, XXIX REVUE DU DROIT 
PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L’ETRANGER 313 (1912). 
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essential difference between them, and their binding force upon the contracting parties is 
the same, whatever be their name.19  
 
This posture sought to impose a formal coherence on what remained a very rich 
repertoire of forms for the making of promises between states. Variations in nomenclature 
reflected the fact that older writings on the law of nations had assumed a repertoire of different 
kinds of agreement, rather than a unitary category of treaty.20 Such variations were still used as 
rough indicia of relative importance and solemnity, and some authors posited distinctions 
between texts of different kinds which, if they did not indicate a distinction in the nature or 
degree of legal force, at least marked differences in the circumstances in which the obligations 
would come to an end. There was a strong sense that the diversity of forms and nomenclature 
mattered, although it was difficult to say precisely how.21 
The form of written agreements was not itself regulated by law, but by a diplomatic craft 
of drafting. Typically, important “political” clauses would be in a principal text, and signed by 
more senior figures or with greater solemnity, whereas more trivial or detailed clauses could be 
relegated to an ancillary text, sometimes signed separately by lesser figures (without necessarily 
implying any lesser degree of legal force). These practices responded to practical and aesthetic 
considerations, but were also amenable to differentiation between public and secret texts. Secret 
clauses or “réserves” of the kind satirized earlier by Kant,22 and prohibited by some European 
constitutions, sometimes went as far as contradicting commitments made in the principal (public) 
text, but there were also less flagrantly contradictory ancillary texts, of uncertain status, which 
merely gave a different complexion to the principal text. These features of treaty practice—the 
																																																								
19 See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920) 664–65 
(emphasis in original; footnote in original omitted).  
20 Note also distinctions between traité-contrat and traité-loi; and between mere contracts (involving disparate 
wills but agreement on a shared external end) and Vereinbarung (involving a genuine fusion of wills), with only the 
latter capable of creating law rather than subjective rights. HEINRICH TRIEPEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT 
INTERNE 49–61 (René Brunet trans., 1920); Arnold D. McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Character of 
Treaties, 11 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 100, 105–16 (1930).  
21 E.g., Jules Basdevant queried whether the distinction between “treaties” (i.e., here, agreements concluded 
with the intervention of the supreme treaty-making authority within a state) and agreements made in some other 
form was relevant to the obligatory character of the texts. Jules Basdevant, La Conclusion et la rédaction des traités 
et des instruments diplomatiques autres que les traités, 15 RECUEIL DES COURS 535, 545 (1926). This hint is not 
further explored. See also McNair, supra note 20. 
22 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 94, 114–15 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. 
Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991).  
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diversity of forms and terms, and the centrality of a flexible craft of drafting—would prove 
major obstacles to initiatives for greater publicity. 
The use of secret treaties and ancillary texts had already been an object of political 
contestation, albeit with quite different political inflections, in earlier moments of tension over 
the relation between the domestic political order and national and imperial foreign policy.23 In 
the late nineteenth century, European jurists, motivated by a need to systematize the material 
basis of international law, proposed a comprehensive international treaty collection, but 
conceded that this might include only treaties the publication of which would not be precluded 
“by reasons of state or by political expediency [convenances politiques].”24  In the early 
twentieth century, gradual revelations of inter-imperial dealings shaped by secret clauses and 
ancillary texts, associated with mounting tension between France and Germany, prompted more 
far-reaching attacks on secrecy from across the political spectrum. In France, revelations in 1911 
that Germany’s non-interference in Morocco had been purchased with the (undisclosed) cession 
of parts of the French Congo led to the fall of the government and harsh criticism in the 
Chambres and press. The pro-colonial lobby was most upset about the substance of the bargain, 
but on the left there were demands for constitutional change to preclude secret treaties. While 
this failed, the new government undertook to submit foreign policy, insofar as possible, to the 
Chambres and to public opinion, and to take a broad view of the categories of treaty requiring 
approval.25 Revelations that the British had been apprised of a secret Franco-Spanish treaty gave 
rise to attacks in Parliament on the perceived underhandedness of this diplomacy.  
Spanning different substantive and party-political debates, one can discern a cluster of 
persistent and related concerns in the early twentieth century. Secret treaties were seen as an 
autocratic anachronism, out of place in the democratic state insofar as they undermined the 
proper role of legislatures or, for some thinkers, citizens themselves, in monitoring foreign 
policy. Secret treaties were seen as inimical to peace, whether because they allowed states to 																																																								
23 Particularly the American and French Revolutions, and in nineteenth-century British debates over free trade. 
This and following paragraphs condense material from Megan Donaldson, From Secret Diplomacy to Diplomatic 
Secrecy: Secrecy and Publicity in the International Legal Order c 1919–1950 (2016) (unpublished JSD dissertation, 
New York University School of Law) (on file with author). 
24 Institut de Droit international, Voeu concernant la publication des traités (Sept. 11, 1885), available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1885_brux_01_fr.pdf. An 1891 proposal for the formation of an 
International Union to oversee publication of treaties petered out. DENYS PETER MYERS, MANUAL OF COLLECTIONS 
OF TREATIES AND OF COLLECTIONS RELATING TO TREATIES 600–03 (1922). 
25 See Jèze, supra note 18, at 318, 320–21. A demand for constitutional revision of Article 8 failed (146 votes in 
the Chambre des Députés and 372 against). Id. at 319. 
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make offensive alliances, or because they fostered an atmosphere of suspicion and apprehension, 
thereby rendering more likely the outbreak of conflict. This apprehension and resulting 
possibility of violence in turn favored brute power politics, and was thought to hinder the 
construction of a law-governed interstate system. 
 
II. THE FORMULATION AND QUALIFICATION OF ARTICLE 18, C. 1919–1923 	
The Early Life of Article 18 	
  World War I threw into sharp relief the power of treaties, public or secret, in the 
international order. The discovery in 1914 of the extent of British commitments to France was 
part of the impetus for the formation of the Union of Democratic Control, a group aiming to 
increase parliamentary control of foreign policy. The Bolsheviks’ 1917 release of wartime secret 
treaties found in tsarist archives cast secret treaties in a particularly nefarious light, and 
sharpened preexisting concerns about their effects.26 Criticisms of secret diplomacy, while 
particularly strong on the left,27 had some appeal across the political spectrum, especially in 
Britain and the United States.28 These criticisms were both reflected and amplified by Woodrow 
Wilson’s embrace of “open covenants” and “diplomacy [that would] proceed always frankly and 
in the public view.”29  
 Agendas for reform covered quite a range of positions, from demands that negotiations 
themselves should be public to demands for publication of final treaty texts, and from a focus on 
empowering citizens directly in foreign policy, to strengthening legislatures (or committees of 
experts within them) to act on behalf of citizens. The publication of treaties once made was a 																																																								
26 See, e.g., publication of English texts under the aegis of the Union of Democratic Control. THE SECRET 
TREATIES AND UNDERSTANDINGS: TEXT OF THE AVAILABLE DOCUMENTS (F. Seymour Cocks ed., 1917).  
27 See, e.g., Statement of War Aims as Adopted at a Joint Conference of the Societies Affiliated with the British 
Trades Union Congress and the British Labour Party [Dec. 28, 1917], reproduced in BRITISH LABOR AND THE WAR: 
RECONSTRUCTORS FOR A NEW WORLD 343 (Paul U. Kellogg & Arthur Gleason eds., 1919).   
28 See ARNO MAYER, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW DIPLOMACY, 1917–1918 (1959); Peter Jackson, French 
Security and a British ‘Continental Commitment’ After the First World War: A Reassessment, 126 ENGLISH HIST. 
REV. 345, 347–49 (2011); GEORGE BERNARD NOBLE, POLICIES AND OPINIONS AT PARIS, 1919: WILSONIAN 
DIPLOMACY, THE VERSAILLES PEACE, AND FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION 301–52 (1935) (on the shifting importance 
given to “open covenants” in French press debates).  
29 Woodrow Wilson, The Terms of Peace [Address to both Houses of Congress, Jan. 8, 1918], in IN OUR FIRST 
YEAR OF WAR: MESSAGES AND ADDRESSES TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE MARCH 5, 1917, TO APRIL 6, 1918, 
at 150, 156 (1918). 
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relatively minimalist, and seemingly uncontroversial, goal. It had been proposed by various 
pacifist and internationalist groups during WWI, but the text that would become Article 18 was 
ultimately introduced into the draft Covenant by American figures.30 It attracted no debate in the 
League of Nations Commission, the body responsible for the drafting of the Covenant. This is 
perhaps unsurprising, given the sheer number of major issues then under discussion, but it also 
indicates that Article 18 was consonant with aspirations for the reform of diplomacy that 
negotiators either accepted, or found difficult to oppose, at least in public. 
 In its final form, Article 18 read:  
 
Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the 
League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be 
published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so 
registered. 
 
A Memorandum of May 1920, drafted by the League Secretariat’s Legal Section and the 
secretary-general, reflected what Article 18 was intended to achieve: 
 
Publicity has for a long time been considered as a source of moral strength in the 
administration of National Law. It should equally strengthen the laws and engagements 
which exist between nations. It will promote public control. It will awaken public 
interest. It will remove causes for distrust and conflict [and] . . . enable the League . . . to 
extend a moral sanction to the contractual obligations of its Members. It will, moreover, 
contribute to the formation of a clear and indisputable system of International Law.31 
 
On paper, Article 18 marked a shift from a pre-war world, in which the secret treaty was 
criticized but legally permitted, to a post-WWI order in which such treaties would be abolished, 																																																								
30  David Hunter Miller (legal adviser to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace) introduced a 
requirement for publicity of treaties; Robert Lansing (U.S. secretary of state) added the component of registration 
with the Secretariat (although Alfred Zimmern, then serving in the Political Intelligence department of the FO, had 
proposed something similar); and Wilson himself contributed the provision that no treaty should be binding unless 
registered. DAVID HUNTER MILLER, 1 THE DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 19, 29, 49, 198 (1928).  
31 The Registration and Publication of Treaties as Prescribed Under Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, as published in 1 LNTS 9, para. 1 (emphasis in original) [hereinafter 1920 Secretariat Memorandum]. See 
also, e.g., M. F. LARNAUDE, LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS 39 (1920). 
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at least for League members. The role accorded to the Secretariat in registering treaties sat 
alongside other provisions which hinted at a larger evolution toward a more collective, 
institutionalized legal order. Article 19 envisaged that “[t]he Assembly [would] from time to 
time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become 
inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger 
the peace of the world.”32 Article 20 provided that members “agree that this Covenant is 
accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the 
terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements 
inconsistent with the terms thereof.”  
The 1920 Secretariat Memorandum offered an expansive, antiformalist definition of the 
phrase “every treaty or international engagement” in Article 18. This was said to encompass “not 
only every formal Treaty of whatsoever character and every International Convention, but also 
any other International Engagement or Act by which nations or their Governments intend to 
establish legal obligations between themselves and another State, Nation or Government.”33 
The Memorandum gave full effect to a reading of the Covenant in which registration, and 
thence publication, was a precondition of legal force. To this end, it proposed that treaties be 
submitted for registration, at the latest, by the date on which the parties considered them to come 
into force.34  
While delegates on the Council approved the 1920 Secretariat Memorandum, closed-door 
discussions revealed concerns about the full import of Article 18. The delegates agreed between 
themselves on support for the “grand moral idea” that peoples must not be engaged by 
governments without their knowledge, and Léon Bourgeois (France) expressed resistance to 																																																								
32 Due to fears that a robust reading might open the path to revision of the peace treaties, Article 19 was given a 
relatively narrow interpretation, and none of the efforts to invoke the provision came to fruition. HERMANN MOSLER, 
THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY 289–90 (1980). 
33 1920 Secretariat Memorandum, supra note 31, at para. 3.  
34 Id., para. 5. The Memorandum permitted treaties to be submitted for registration by one party alone, provided 
that the text had been finally agreed between the parties (para. 8), and suggested that parties should deposit “a 
textual and complete copy [of the treaty or engagement] with all appurtenant declarations, protocols, ratifications, 
etc. . . . with an authentic statement that this text represents the full contents of the Treaty or Engagement” (para. 6). 
British officials, apparently not aware of the arrangements in the 1920 Secretariat Memorandum, circulated to states 
alternative proposals, namely that bilateral treaties be registered by both parties jointly, but multilateral treaties be 
registered only by the government of the state in which the treaty was signed. Circular Curzon to representatives 
abroad, Sept. 20, 1920, FO 372/1409 [File No. 208994] [“FO” in archival references denotes National Archives 
(UK), Foreign Office papers (held at Kew)]. The Secretariat, concerned that placing the onus on the headquarters 
government in this way would have made registration contingent on the diligence of a single government, reasserted 
the authority of the Council-approved Memorandum. Drummond to Hankey, Oct. 1, 1920, FO 372/1409 
[T11337/9008/350]. 
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carving out exceptions to Article 18. However, he joined with Arthur Balfour (British Empire) in 
arguing that members retained a capacity to conclude treaties that would not be registered — but 
would nevertheless place the signatories under some moral obligation, which the League might 
uphold. Dr. van Hamel, the Dutch Director of the Legal Section, was recorded as stating that, 
under the Covenant, members of the League would not be bound by an unregistered treaty—but 
that the parties could nevertheless consider themselves bound in some way inter se.35 These 
ominous divergences of opinion about Article 18 were not, however, probed further at this time.  
 
First Tests: French Military Accord and British Financial Arrangements 	
The first real test of Article 18 was a Franco-Belgian military “accord” of 1920.36 At this 
time, Franco-Belgian military arrangements were controversial within Belgium, where socialist 
and Flemish deputies tended to oppose arrangements they perceived as likely to render the state 
dependent on France. It was thus not only military sensitivity, but likely political opposition, 
which shaped early thinking about the final form of the commitments. After early drafts of the 
proposed accord had been prepared by military figures, the Belgian foreign ministry 
contemplated splitting the text into a “political” act, which could be submitted to the Chambres 
(in accordance with Belgian constitutional clauses requiring legislative approval of certain 
treaties, and arrangements for foreign troop movements) and submitted to the League Secretariat 
for registration, and a separate act for the detailed military arrangements, which could be kept 
secret. The idea of a substantive “political” text was abandoned out of a fear that any treaty 
involving France alone, rather than France and Britain together, would still attract opposition in 
Belgium. 37  
																																																								
35 “Questions Connected with the Registration of Treaties which Arose during the Council Meeting at Rome, in 
May, 1920,” enclosed with Van Hamel to Hurst and others, May 6, 1921, League of Nations Archives, Registry 
Files, R1220 [17/12549/69] [“LNA R” in archival references denotes League of Nations Archives, Registry Files 
(held in Geneva)]. 
36 “Accord” is probably best translated as “agreement,” but I follow most contemporary English-language 
sources in simply adopting the French term.  
37 J. E. Helmreich, Convention politique ou accord militaire? La Négociation de l’accord franco-belge de 1920, 
159 GUERRES MONDIALES ET CONFLITS CONTEMPORAINS 21, 25–26 (1990); J. E. Helmreich, The Negotiation of the 
Franco-Belgian Military Accord of 1920, 3 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES 360, 374 (1964). Helmreich worked from 
the Belgian archives. My research in the archives of the French foreign ministry, while likely not capturing all 
military deliberations, captures the French approach to the accord’s legal form. 
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The initial “military accord” had not dealt with matters like the casus foederis, and 
circumstances in which the accord could be brought to an end, but it still had significant political 
implications. In particular, by requiring Belgium to take action in the event of any German 
mobilization, it left Belgium potentially implicated in a war between Germany and Eastern 
European countries; and by envisaging a concerted defense, including along the frontier with 
Luxembourg, it ran counter to Luxembourg’s nominal independence.38 A version of this text was 
signed on July 29, 1920 by Marshal Foch (president of the French Superior Council of War) and 
General Maglinse (chief of the Belgian General Staff). It was thought necessary for governments 
to exchange letters approving this accord, which would be published, although this does not 
appear to have been based on a theory that the military accord otherwise lacked legal force.39  
The Belgians subsequently proposed amendments to the military accord, and at this point 
the Belgian ministry of foreign affairs proposed that the public exchange of letters be expanded 
to cover some aspects of the abandoned “political” accord, and laid before the legislature, 
without being a treaty requiring approval.40 A second version of the military accord thus 
replaced the initial version (adding inter alia a new undertaking by the French to defend the 
Belgian coast, which was politically controversial insofar as it foreshadowed Franco-Belgian 
military action without British involvement).41 Belgian and French foreign ministers exchanged 
public letters approving the accord.42  
When the letters were laid before the Belgian legislature in October 1920, there were 
demands for the military accord to be published.43 The French Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 
(MAE) expressed concern that, when the letters were submitted for registration, the League 
Secretariat would immediately demand the military accord.44 In Britain, questions were asked in 
																																																								
38 Helmreich, Convention politique, supra note 37, at 24.  
39 Basdevant observes that “military conventions” bind states though not embodied in “diplomatic” instruments. 
Basdevant, supra note 21, at 626.  
40 Helmreich, Convention politique, supra note 37, at 29. 
41 This accord is now reproduced in 2 DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS 1920, at 566 (1999). On the 
contents, see Helmreich, Convention politique, supra note 38, at 28; Helmreich, Negotiation, supra note 37, at 377. 
42 For the final text of the letters, see Exchange of Letters of 10 and 15 September, 1920, Between the Belgian 
and French Governments, Concerning the Approval of the Franco-Belgian Military Understanding of September 7, 
1920, 2 LNTS 128. 
43 Helmreich, Negotiation, supra note 37, at 377.  
44 Note pour Monsieur Berthelot, Oct. 18, 1920, MAE CPC 73 [Z126/10] [“MAE CPC” in archival references 
denotes Archives diplomatiques (France), “Correspondance politique et commerciale” series (held at La 
Courneuve)]. 
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Parliament about whether Britain would press for registration.45 Britain was probably the only 
other power influential enough to press France to submit the accord, and the Foreign Office (FO) 
was well aware that if other powers withheld politically significant texts as France was 
apparently doing, “the whole principle of registration will fall to pieces.”46 However, Britain had 
declined to give security guarantees sought by France, and found it difficult politically to do 
anything which might be perceived as weakening fallback Franco-Belgian arrangements. 
Moreover, the British Treasury had become concerned, for its part, about registration of various 
financial dealings.  
Internally, French and British officials began wondering if Article 18 might be limited in 
some way. French officials argued that the military accord should be seen “not as an 
international treaty, but as an arrangement between general staffs, subject to variations in 
accordance with military necessity,” and impossible to divulge without compromising national 
defense.47 The British Treasury suggested that “an endeavour should be made to limit the scope” 
of Article 18 to “International Treaties and Agreements of first class importance.”48 The FO 
dismissed as “useless” any endeavour to limit Article 18 in this sense,49 and rejected also an 
exception for “arrangements of a purely commercial or financial character,” which encompassed 
exactly the treaties regarding commerce and preferential trading rights that Britain was keen to 
see states publish.50 At the same time, the FO found it difficult to articulate any principled 
approach: 
 
Possibly the League [Secretariat] might wink at the non-registration of financial 
agreements of the kind indicated in the Treasury letter; but they cannot logically wink at 
the non-registration of an instrument [like the Franco-Belgian military accord] which is 
not so very far removed from an offensive and defensive alliance. There will be a hue and 
cry about “secret diplomacy” again . . . I confess I do not see any formula which will 
																																																								
45 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, 5TH SER., vol. 133, col. 1374W (Oct. 25, 1920), cols. 1549–50 (Oct. 26, 
1920); vol. 134, cols. 35–36 (Nov. 1, 1920) [hereinafter HC DEB.].  
46 Minute Mounsey, Sept. 15, 1920, FO 372/1409 [T10214/9008/350].  
47 MAE to Embassy, Brussels (with handwritten amendments), Oct. 24, 1920, MAE CPC 73 [Z126/10]. 
48 Blackett [Treasury] to Under-Secretary of State, Sept. 7, 1920, FO 372/1409 [T10214/9008/350]. 
49 Minute J. Balfour, Oct. 1, 1920, FO 371/5455 [W493/32/4]. 
50 Blackett [Treasury] to Under-Secretary of State, Sept. 29, 1920; Minute Crowe, Oct. 3, 1920; both FO 
372/1409 [T11090/9008/350]. 
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meet with approval, but “agreements of a technical nature” might be stretched to cover 
anything.51 
 
Senior political figures were divided. The foreign secretary, Curzon, thought it was 
impractical to expect military details to be published.52 On the other hand, Robert Cecil (a 
Conservative politician, and a major supporter of the League, then serving as a delegate for 
South Africa in the League Assembly) saw the application of Article 18 to the military accord as 
a crucial point of principle. Drafters of the Covenant, Cecil argued, had hoped that “one of 
[Article 18’s] most valuable results would be to hinder secret military preparations [which] have 
been in the past a prolific source of suspicion + counter-preparations leading ultimately to 
war.”53  
For Balfour, who was to represent Britain at the upcoming League meetings,  
 
[If] we are to interpret [Article 18] as meaning that every nation is at liberty to make what 
secret arrangement it likes . . ., provided it does not ask the League to defend that 
arrangement until it has been published; [then] Article 18 does really nothing to put an 
end to so-called secret diplomacy. If, on the other hand, Article 18 is to be interpreted as 
meaning that [withholding a treaty] is an offence against the provisions of the Covenant . 
. . then . . . the refusal of France and Belgium to comply with the Covenant brings us face 
to face with a very serious international issue.54 
 
In the face of this dilemma, Balfour wondered whether, if the Council asked the French 
and Belgian governments to register the treaty “in its broad outline,” and to give formal 
assurances that it was purely defensive, the Council might then decide that the military details 
need not be submitted for registration.55 
Hurst noted that the Covenant’s drafters had probably intended to oblige states to register 
all treaties—but that they may not have considered “the inconvenience which a strict 
construction of the Article would entail, or the difficulty of enforcing it.” Having regard to these 																																																								
51 Minute Villiers, Oct. 1, 1920, FO 371/5455 [W493/32/4] (emphasis added). 
52 Curzon to Cecil, Oct. 5, 1920, FO 371/5455 [W493/32/4]. 
53 Cecil to Curzon, Oct. 6, 1920, FO 371/5455 [W857/32/4]. 
54 Memo Balfour to Hurst, Oct. 20, 1920, FO 372/1410 [T12369/9008/350]. 
55 Id. 
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matters, and the wording of the French version,56 he suggested Balfour’s approach would be 
acceptable.57 This reflected the British position throughout the ensuing debates: the FO realized 
the systemic importance of Article 18, yet could generate no really principled limitations to it, 
and ended up making pragmatic efforts to tailor the provision to national needs.  
The French delegation to the League was instructed to press at Geneva for an 
interpretation of Article 18 as covering any “convention, treaty or accord constituting . . . a state-
to-state engagement, that is to say, of a diplomatic order,” but not “contracts of a commercial or 
administrative or technical order.”58 Britain did not commit to supporting precisely this position, 
but the two leading League members agreed prior to the League session that Article 18 could be 
qualified in some way, 59  even if British instructions still urged delegates to “avoid the 
impression of encouraging ‘secret diplomacy.’”60  
 
Deliberations Within the League, Jurisprudence and Scholarship 	
The Secretariat was in a delicate position. On one hand, the need to demonstrate that the 
League was useful to French security rendered it unthinkable to press for registration of what 
France refused to publish. On the other hand, the norm of publication was popular and highly 
symbolic. After the Versailles settlement, which was seen by many internationalists as 
compromising principles of self-determination, and burdening Germany with a victors’ peace, 
Article 18 was one of the few idealistic provisions carried intact into the League order. The 
Secretariat was keen to maintain the faith of internationalist supporters by upholding the 
provision. The Secretariat worked assiduously behind the scenes to hasten submission of 
treaties,61 and Juan Teixidor y Sanchez, the Secretariat official principally responsible for treaty 
registration, was frustrated to see “[t]he Press . . . airing opinions of all kinds on the influence 																																																								
56 See infra note 75 (the French text put the emphasis on the Secretariat’s duty to register, rather than the 
members’ duty to register with the Secretariat).   
57 Memo Hurst to Balfour, Registration of Treaties under Article 18 of the Pact, undated [c. Oct. 1920], FO 
372/1410 [T12369/9008/350]. 
58 Note, Enregistrement des traités, Nov. 11, 1920, MAE SDN 71 [“MAE SDN” in archival references denotes 
Archives diplomatiques (France), “Société des Nations” series (held at La Courneuve)]. 
59 Tufton to [MAE], Nov. 11, 1920, MAE SDN 71. See also minute Hurst, Oct. 29, 1920, FO 372/1410 
[T12369/9008/350]. 
60 Minute Tufton, Nov. 8, 1920, FO 371/5479 [W1832/160/98] (emphasis added).  
61 See, e.g., Teixidor, Note pour Dr. van Hamel, Oct. 1, 1920, LNA R1227 [17/7252/7252]; Drummond to 
Monnet, Oct. 4, 1920, LNA R1227 [17/7252/7252]; Drummond to Balfour; Drummond to Bourgeois; both Aug. 20, 
1920, LNA R1219 [17/6077/69]. 
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that the coming into force of such a [c]onvention, without being registered, or being half-
registered . . . may have on the maintenance of the Covenant.”62  
Teixidor rationalized that the exchange of letters could be registered and the “technical” 
(military) text withheld, analogizing the situation to other treaties involving both an agreement 
between countries and a regulation established by technicians for its execution. However, this 
analogy did not capture the nature of the texts in issue, and even Teixidor himself noted the need 
to ensure that the technical regulation did not run counter to the provisions of the League 
Covenant (something which sat uneasily with registering only the exchange of letters).63  
Eric Drummond, the League’s secretary-general, and a former FO official, was skeptical: 
 
If the Franco-Belgian Convention is made up of two separate instruments, the first, what 
may be called the Diplomatic instrument, and the 2nd solely the technical means by which 
the 1st will be effected, then of course there could be no objection to No. 1 being 
registered, while No. 2 was not. . . . If, however, the one Convention includes both the 
Diplomatic and Military sides, I do not think it possible to register one half of it and omit 
the other.64 
 
While approaches within foreign ministries and the Secretariat up to this point had tried 
either to exempt certain accords from the class of treaties and engagements to which Article 18 
applied, or to withhold “technical” aspects of arrangements, Drummond settled instead on 
something more radical. Echoing earlier Council discussions, he declared that “if countries 
choose to take the risk of concluding Conventions which will not be recognised as binding by the 
other Members of the League, I have always felt they were entitled to do so.”65 Ultimately, the 
exchange of letters was registered without complaint.66  
Dionisio Anzilotti (then an under-secretary-general; and from 1921 a judge on the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)) articulated the same view, but with greater legal 
sophistication. He conceded that “the background of Article 18 . . . is the principle of open 																																																								
62 Teixidor, L’Enregistrement de l’accord franco-belge conclu le mois d’août passé, Sept. 28, 1920, LNA R1227 
[17/7252/7252]. 
63 Id. On Article 20 of the Covenant, see infra text immediately following note 32.  
64 Memorandum Drummond [to van Hamel], Oct. 1, 1920, LNA R1227 [17/7252/7252]. 
65 Id. 
66 Drummond to French MAE, Belgian MAE, Nov. 10, 1920, LNA R1227 [17/7857/7857]. 
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diplomacy” and that “the non validity of unregistered treaties was, in all probability, conceived 
as a sanction intended to enforce the publication rule . . . .” 67 However, he argued that “an 
objective consideration of the provision in itself, with regard to the circumstances from which it 
arose and to the place it has in the system of rules of which it forms a part” left open a much 
more minimalist reading of what it required. He argued: 
 
Before the coming into force of the Covenant, the binding force of international treaties 
only rested upon the moral force of the promise entered into by the contracting parties. . . 
. The Covenant . . . has added to the purely moral sanctions other positive sanctions 
consisting of the coming into movement of the machinery of the League. It seems 
therefore quite natural to me that Article 18 of the Covenant be understood in connection 
with the said sanctions and not otherwise. . . . if the parties agree to be obliged by a non-
registered treaty, the Covenant has nothing to do with it: the treaty remains beyond the 
sphere of the League. . . . The Members of the League, therefore, are not unconditionally 
obliged to register treaties or international engagements entered into by them; they are 
obliged only if they wish to put the said engagements under the protection of the 
League.68  
 
The early vision of Article 18, reflected in the 1920 Secretariat Memorandum, had 
understood it as imposing a new condition of publicity on the creation of legal obligation. The 
Anzilotti/Drummond view reduced Article 18 to a condition merely of access to the particular 
enforcement mechanisms associated with League membership.69 On the latter view, governments 
retained discretion to move at will between the pre-League order and the League regime. As 
internal British debates had acknowledged, reading Article 18 in this manner left little role for 
publicity in ensuring democratic control over foreign policy, or in breaking the cycle of 																																																								
67 Anzilotti to Drummond, Nov. 11, 1920, LNA R1227 [17/8281/7857]. 
68 Id. (emphasis in original). 
69 Anzilotti referred to an agreement accepted as binding by the parties, but not registered, as imposing “moral” 
(perhaps as opposed to “legal”) obligations. Id. Drummond thought unregistered treaties were: “Entirely outside the 
cognizance of the League + therefore impose no moral or material obligation on the other members, nor can any 
appeal to the League be based upon them . . . binding between the contracting parties only for such time as both feel 
bound by them.” Handwritten comments by Drummond, Nov. 21, 1920, on Anzilotti [to Drummond], Nov. 16, 
1920, LNA R1227 [17/8281/7857]. However, the fact that both believed there was no unconditional obligation to 
register treaties suggests that they still, at some level, understood unregistered texts as treaties. 
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suspicion and belligerence over military arrangements. As Teixidor had noted, it also removed 
the possibility of ensuring compliance with states’ undertaking in Article 20 of the Covenant not 
to enter into engagements inconsistent with the Covenant (and limited opportunities for the 
Assembly to advise, under Article 19, on reconsideration of treaties in changing conditions).70 
Ironically, the Secretariat seems to have embraced a limited reading of Article 18 at least partly 
because of the pressure of public opinion. The minimalist interpretation avoided both the “patent 
evasion of the law” inherent in registering only the exchange of letters, but also the appearance 
of “the weakness and the lack of viability of the League” which would result from a showdown 
between the Secretariat and the French government.71  
Nevertheless, these internal Secretariat deliberations did bring to the surface a 
fundamental difficulty. The view that all treaties should be published, and particularly the Article 
18 scheme for registration and publication through the Secretariat, was in some tension with the 
existing law of treaties. This tension emerged more clearly as the Dutch representative, alarmed 
at the apparent Franco-Belgian challenge to Article 18, proposed in the Assembly that the 
Council appoint a committee of jurists to inquire into the provision. The representative, Jonkheer 
van Karnebeek, outlined three possible interpretations of the status of an unregistered treaty in 
light of Article 18:72 
 
(1) States were genuinely not bound by a treaty pending registration.  
(2) States were bound by an unregistered treaty from the moment of ratification, but 
could not demand execution of the obligations pending registration.  
(3) States were bound from the moment of ratification regardless of registration, but 
precluded from relying on the treaty when appealing to the League unless the treaty had 
been registered.  
 
None of the three interpretations was entirely convincing. On the first interpretation, a 
ratified but unregistered treaty had, at best, the status of a pre-Covenant treaty which had been 																																																								
70 Drummond had concluded that the Secretariat must “assume that the Convention contains nothing contrary to 
Article 20, and rely on the pledged word of France and Belgium in this respect.” Memorandum Drummond [to van 
Hamel], Oct. 1, 1920, supra note 64. 
71 Anzilotti to Drummond, Nov. 11, 1920, supra note 67. 
72 Minutes of 7th Plen. Mtg. (Nov. 19, 1920), in LEAGUE OF NATIONS. RECORDS OF THE FIRST ASSEMBLY. 
PLENARY MEETINGS 148, 155–156 (1920) [hereinafter FIRST ASSEMBLY: PLENARY MEETINGS]. 
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signed but not ratified. This approximated the strong reading of Article 18 reflected in the 1920 
Secretariat Memorandum, and shared by most internationalists familiar with the provision. It was 
supported by van Karnebeek as conforming most closely to the language of the provision,73 and 
embraced also by Giuseppe Motta (a Swiss delegate), who noted that the popular campaign 
conducted in Switzerland in favor of joining the League had presented Article 18 as “one of the 
pillars of the new [League] edifice.”74 However, this first interpretation involved a major shift 
from the statist, voluntarist creation of legal obligations which had long been central to the law 
of treaties to a more centralized system in which treaties would have legal force only after the 
Secretariat’s action in registering them.  
The second interpretation would mitigate the severity of this shift by preserving the 
significance of the parties’ intention to be bound, and inserting a further stage prior to full entry 
into force. But this “suspensive” reading, which was perhaps a better fit with the French than the 
English text,75 appeared to emanate from civil law doctrines applicable to private rights. The 
interim stage, in which parties were bound but could not demand execution, seemed to some 
commentators a “purely verbal” construction.76  
The third interpretation was close to the view articulated by Anzilotti and Drummond 
(although Anzilotti and Drummond were more reluctant to concede the existence of a legal 
obligation prior to registration). In the Assembly, it attracted support from the politician and 
former diplomat Tommaso Tittoni, an Italian delegate.77 This interpretation was consistent with 
existing doctrine on the effect of ratification, and minimized the risk of embarrassing 
confrontations over non-compliance. However, this interpretation focused on the second 
sentence of Article 18, while virtually ignoring the opening clause (“Every treaty or international 
engagement … shall be forthwith registered”). In downplaying the obligation to submit treaties 
for registration, and leaving governments a choice to make secret treaties provided they did not 
seek to rely on them before the League, it drained Article 18 of much of its anticipated effect in 																																																								
73 Id. at 156. 
74 Id. at 160; see also comments of van Karnebeek in Minutes of 10th Plen. Mtg. (Nov. 23, 1920), in FIRST 
ASSEMBLY: PLENARY MEETINGS, supra note 72, 203, 209. 
75  “Tout traité ou engagement international conclu à l'avenir par un membre de la Société devra être 
immédiatement enregistré par le secrétariat et publié par lui aussitôt que possible. Aucun de ces traités ou 
engagements internationaux ne sera obligatoire avant d’avoir été enregistré.” 
76 See, e.g., CHARLES ROUSSEAU, 1 PRINCIPES GÉNÉRAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 316–17 (1944). 
77 Minutes of 8th Plen. Mtg. (Nov. 20, 1920) (original erroneously marked Nov. 10), in FIRST ASSEMBLY: 
PLENARY MEETINGS, supra note 72, 162, 177. 
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strengthening democratic control of foreign policy, and in removing suspicions, associated with 
secrecy, which threatened peace and stability.78  
From a systemic point of view, perhaps only the first interpretation could have been 
transformative. The requirement would not have attracted universal compliance—as evidenced 
by the Franco-Belgian case—but if upheld as a comprehensive norm, it might gradually have 
caused governments to doubt the reliability of any unpublished treaty, and thus increased 
incentives to make important undertakings in texts that would be registered and published. 
However, this kind of systemic argument rarely surfaced in the League debates. 
As new scrutiny of Article 18 loomed, the British brought their own challenge into the 
open. The government wrote to the secretary-general, in correspondence then circulated to all 
League members, that it had entered into “a large number of financial arrangements, many of 
them of small general importance . . . with a view to completing and liquidating the abnormal 
transactions rendered inevitable by the war,” which the government “[did] not conceive . . . were 
in any way analogous to the Treaties contemplated by Article 18 . . . .” The letter announced the 
government’s view that it would be “unnecessary, and in many cases inexpedient” to publish the 
detail of such transactions.79 
By late 1920, the British Treasury had clarified that it did not wish to register: (a) 
agreements with allies for the settlement of claims relating to goods and services supplied during 
the war; (b) agreements relating to money advances by or to Britain; and (c) agreements for the 
sale of surplus material. The Treasury believed that texts in categories (a) and (c) were not 
treaties or international engagements within the meaning of Article 18, but acknowledged that 
category (b) presented difficulties. These agreements came in a variety of forms. Some might 
well be treaties or international engagements. However, the Treasury insisted, if these texts were 
required to be registered and published, 
 
it might well become impossible for any nation to come to the assistance financially of 
another nation in an emergency . . . simultaneous publication [to] the legislative 
assemblies of the countries concerned . . . might give rise to serious political difficulty . . 
. [or] entail grave risks to the financial credit of the borrowing country. 																																																								
78 In which members “solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent 
with the terms” of the Covenant.  
79 Spicer to Drummond, Feb. 15, 1921, LNA R1220 [17/11221/69].  
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Moreover, publication of an agreement postponing payment of debts or reducing rates of interest 
would no doubt produce analogous requests from other debtors “which it might, on political 
grounds, be impossible to resist.”80 
In a cursory opinion, the British Law Officers (attorney general and solicitor general) 
advised the Treasury that it could withhold from registration categories (a) and (c), and any 
agreements in category (b) reached through other than “diplomatic” channels.81 The opinion 
made no attempt to grapple with either the interpretation of “treaty or international engagement” 
in Article 18, or the definition of a treaty under international law. 
In Geneva, van Karnebeek succeeded in his initiative for a committee of jurists to 
examine “the scope of Article 18 from a legal point of view” and “prepare . . . relevant proposals 
to secure a uniform application of the article in respect of the validity of Treaties.”	82  This 
committee (hereinafter Article 18 Committee) consisted mainly of legal advisers to European 
foreign ministries, and seemed set to provide the in-depth legal analysis which had not been 
undertaken on adoption of Article 18. Yet the Committee also struggled to find a principled 
reading of Article 18 which would accommodate states’ desire for a residual possibility of 
secrecy. The Committee’s report was fractured, indicating that the report was a product of 
compromise, or simply that there were no attractive legal answers. The Committee recognized 
the aspirations for structural change inherent in Article 18, noting that the “fundamental aim” of 
the provision was to “suppress secret Treaties, which in the political sphere constitute a danger to 
the maintenance of peace” and to secure “a broad system of publicity for international 
engagements.” The report offered a relatively strong reading of the existing text of Article 18. It 
rejected both the Anzilotti/Drummond view that registration was not actually obligatory at all 
(the third interpretation in the schema above), and the approach taken by van Hamel and 																																																								
80 Instructions to the Law Officers to Advise [c. Dec. 11, 1920], FO 372/1640 [T1443/211/350]. The sorts of 
arrangements about which the Treasury were concerned in category (b) included some which were “not even 
published to our own Parliament”. Memorandum B, enclosed in Gower to Hankey, Dec. 11, 1920, FO 372/1640 
[T531/211/350] (note that in this earlier memorandum, the enumeration is different, and what would later be 
category (b) is here labelled category (c)).  
81 Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, Jan. 25, 1921, FO 372/1640 [T1443/211/350].  
82 Appointment of the Committee Entrusted with the Examination from a Legal Point of View of the Scope of 
Article 18 of the Covenant, in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 112. Of six members nominated by the 
League Council, five accepted the invitation: Scialoja (former Italian foreign minister and now delegate to the 
League); Fromageot (legal adviser to the French MAE); Hurst (legal adviser to the FO); Struycken (adviser to the 
Dutch government); and Maurice Bourquin (legal adviser to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  
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Teixidor on the Franco-Belgian military accord, whereby registration of one element of an 
agreement was considered sufficient compliance with Article 18. It also rejected exceptions like 
those which France, Belgium, and Britain had purported to find in Article 18, based on the 
nature, form, importance or duration of international engagements.83  
Instead the Article 18 Committee devised an interpretation similar to the “suspensive” 
reading (the second interpretation in the schema above),84 but asserted that even this position 
entailed “impracticable and dangerous” consequences. The report laid out a range of avenues for 
amending the provision, including: deleting the second sentence of Article 18 altogether; 
retaining the second sentence but giving registration retroactive effect by changing “unless” to 
“until”;85 inserting an “additional article” reflecting the Anzilotti/Drummond approach (the third 
interpretation in the schema above);86 and adding to the obligation to register agreements the 
words “subject to such provisions as the Assembly may unanimously decide upon,” thereby 
enabling the Assembly to exclude categories of treaties, such as “technical” instruments.87 
The Article 18 Committee’s report triggered, in a series of League committees, the same 
questions which had dogged the Article 18 Committee’s own proceedings. A Sub-Committee of 
the League’s First Committee betrayed some unease about any major qualification to Article 18 
as written, and modified the Article 18 Committee’s suggested Assembly regulations to require 
that, even for administrative or technical agreements, the parties submit basic details of the 
agreement.88 In the First Committee, the British fought back, insisting that publication of such 
details “would in itself be sufficient to produce all the disastrous results which might flow from 
publication in full.”89  The lawyer and diplomat Raul Fernandes (Brazil) disagreed; if an 
agreement opened a credit, there could be no disadvantage in announcing this; indeed “the 																																																								
83 Report of the Committee Appointed to Study the Scope of Article 18 of the Covenant from a Legal Point of 
View, Aug. 13, 1921, C.256.M.197.1921.V (A.C.31), 3 [hereinafter Article 18 Committee Report]. 
84 “The contract exists from the moment that the consent of the parties has been expressed in the proper forms, 
and consequently the Powers which have concluded it are no longer free to escape unilaterally from its obligations. 
But . . . the new registration formality . . . is a condition which suspends the obligation to fulfil the conventional 
engagements.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
85 Id. at 5. 
86 Id. at 7. The proposed insertion read: “No treaty [etc.] . . . may be invoked before the Council or the 
Assembly, or before the [Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)] or before any other organisation under the 
authority of the League unless it has been previously registered.” 
87 Id. at 6. 
88 RECORDS OF THE SECOND ASSEMBLY: MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEES, at Annex 11 (1921) [hereinafter 
SECOND ASSEMBLY: COMMITTEES]. 
89 1st Committee, 7th Mtg. [Sept. 26, 1921], in SECOND ASSEMBLY: COMMITTEES, supra note 88, at 69–70 
(Hurst). 
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publicity given to the agreement would constitute an element in the world’s tranquillity.”90 Hurst 
suggested the summary registration procedure would provide an uncontrolled loophole. 
Fernandes retorted that the effect of Article 18 would not be weakened by summary registration 
but by failure to register altogether.91 Balfour returned to the line of attack he had pursued 
earlier. He argued that the framers of Article 18 had intended “to put a stop . . . to those 
arrangements which were fundamentally aggressive in their character,” and contrasted treaties of 
this kind with “the small, transitory, but very necessary, arrangements” which Britain sought to 
keep secret. He reiterated that “[c]redit was very sensitive, and very easily shattered by public 
announcements which might be used or misused by interested parties.”92 The British ultimately 
prevailed, and the First Committee returned to the original recommendations of the Article 18 
Committee.93  
These highly technical debates went largely unnoticed by public campaigners against 
“secret treaties.” In an effort to attract attention, Konni Zilliacus, a committed internationalist in 
the League’s Information Section, passed the Article 18 Committee report, with an explanation 
of its implications, to the liberal Manchester Guardian. The editor printed parts of the report, 
suggesting that it undermined the core of Article 18,94 and sent the material to the pro-League 
British politician Robert Cecil, then representing South Africa at the League.95 This may have 
helped mobilize League of Nations Union and Liberal Party support for the preservation of 
Article 18, and armed Cecil for debate in the plenary Assembly.96 
In the Assembly, Cecil protested the narrowing of Article 18, and embraced the point 
made by others, that it was impossible to distinguish between “political” and “technical” 
treaties.97 The Article 18 Committee itself broke ranks, with the Italian legal adviser announcing 																																																								
90 Id. at 70. 
91 Id. at 71; 1st Committee, 8th Mtg. [Sept. 27, 1921], in SECOND ASSEMBLY: COMMITTEES, supra note 88, at 
75. 
92 1st Committee, 8th Mtg. [Sept. 27, 1921], in SECOND ASSEMBLY: COMMITTEES, supra note 88, at 75–76. 
93 With some minor variations, in SECOND ASSEMBLY: COMMITTEES, supra note 88, at 195–201 [hereinafter 
First Committee Report]. 
94  A Threat to the League. The Clause in the Covenant Against Secret Treaties. Hague Committee’s 
Recommendation that it Be Weakened, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 1921, at 9.  
95 Correspondence cited in Ken Millen-Penn, Democratic Control, Public Opinion, and League Diplomacy, 157 
WORLD AFF. 207, 211–12 (1995). 
96 See, e.g., Distrust of the Coalition, TIMES [LONDON], Nov. 25, 1921, at 5; Anson to Secretary-General, Oct. 8, 
1921, LNA R1220 [17/16561/69]. 
97 Cecil agreed that some means should be devised to exempt minor engagements, which it would be very 
inconvenient to publish, from the scope of Article 18, but was dissatisfied with the Article 18 Committee’s 
proposals.  
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a personal view that the current language of Article 18 could be interpreted even without express 
qualification to require only the registration of treaties or even lesser engagements “which may 
engage the future fate of nations.”98  
Debates at the League were frustratingly circular and shallow. No one pointed out that 
even if the ultimate end of Article 18 had been “put a stop . . . to those arrangements which were 
fundamentally aggressive in their character,”99 this could not be achieved by insisting that states 
only needed to register these kinds of sensitive treaties. If anything, this would have made 
compliance with Article 18 even more unlikely. Only a requirement making registration and 
thence publication an undisputed threshold for any commitments having legal force had any real 
prospect of incentivizing governments otherwise tempted to secrecy to make politically 
significant commitments in texts that would be subject to registration and publication.  
Those supporting the Article 18 Committee approach, led by British representatives, 
ultimately retreated from the attempt to achieve formal amendment of the Covenant, and sought 
to postpone debate to 1922, subject to an understanding that “in the meantime, Members . . . are 
at liberty to interpret their obligations under Article 18 in conformity with the proposed 
amendment.”100 The latter part of the resolution was technically not adopted,101 but the general 
tenor of the debates tended to add to accumulated doubts about the scope of Article 18.  
As it turned out, further substantive consideration was deferred indefinitely,102 and a 
“silence” fell over Article 18.103 The Secretariat declined to take any public position on whether 
particular texts were required to be registered. It did keep regular lists, sourced from the press, of 
treaties apparently made but not yet registered, but this information was not used to shame 
recalcitrant governments.104 After a few initial attempts, Drummond largely ceased writing 
personally to foreign ministry contacts to press for compliance.105  
																																																								
98 32d Plen. Mtg. [Oct. 5, 1921], in RECORDS OF THE SECOND ASSEMBLY 851 (1921) [hereinafter SECOND 
ASSEMBLY: PLENARY]. 
99 1st Committee, 8th Mtg. [Sept. 27, 1921], in SECOND ASSEMBLY: COMMITTEES, supra note 88, at 75–76. See 
also, e.g., Seferiades (Greece), id. at 77; Fernandes (Brazil) in 32d Plen. Mtg. [Oct. 5, 1921], in SECOND 
ASSEMBLY: PLENARY, supra note 98, at 850; First Committee Report, supra note 93, at 197. 
100 SECOND ASSEMBLY: PLENARY, supra note 98, at 851. 
101 33d Plen. Mtg. [Oct. 5, 1921], in SECOND ASSEMBLY: PLENARY, supra note 98, at 895. 
102 In 1922, Article 18 was back on the agenda of the First Committee, with Hurst, Struycken, and Rolin urging 
that amendments be adopted, but supporters of Article 18 again managed to postpone consideration of it.  
103 RAOUL GENET, 3 TRAITÉ DE DIPLOMATIE ET DE DROIT DIPLOMATIQUE 451 (1932). 
104 Hudson to van Hamel, July 9, 1923, LNA R1220 [17/12863/69]. 
105 Minute Drummond, Aug. 17, 1922, LNA R1222 [17/22111/69]. 
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Debate in the wider legal community reflected the same divergence of views as existed 
within League bodies. A report on Article 18 presented to the Institut de Droit International as 
part of the Institut’s ongoing consideration of the Covenant proposed an amendment to Article 
18 broadly similar to the one which had finally emerged from the League debates, but which had 
never been formally approved (i.e., providing that non-registration would merely suspend the 
parties’ obligations, and excepting large classes of instruments from even this narrow 
provision).106 Comments from Institut members ranged from opposition to any compromise of 
the universal and absolute quality of Article 18, to assertions that, if there was to be a change to 
Article 18, the provision might just as well dispense with registration for all treaties whose 
publication appeared inopportune or dangerous to the signatories. 107  Interwar efforts at 
codification of the law of treaties were also divided.108 Publicists generally reiterated the history 
of debates within the League organs, and noted that states had fallen short of rigorous 
compliance.109 Perhaps most significantly, the PCIJ (possibly influenced by Anzilotti) seems not 
to have raised Article 18 in instances in which the PCIJ adjudicated matters related to 
unregistered treaties.110  																																																								
106 Examen de l’organisation et des statuts de la Société des Nations. Rapport de MM. Adatci et Ch. de 
Visscher, 8 ANNUAIRE DE L’IDI 22, 63 (1923). 
107 Id. at 75, 81. 
108 The Havana Convention on Treaties, Feb. 20, 1928, required publication of treaties after exchange of 
ratifications but stipulated that a failure to discharge this “international duty” did not affect the force of the treaty, or 
fulfilment of obligations contained therein: Art. 4. See text reproduced in 29 AJIL SUPP. 1205. However, the 
Harvard Draft convention on the law of treaties assumed that Article 18 was operative, and tried to develop it 
further. Advisory Committee of the [Harvard] Research in International Law, Codification of International Law Part 
III: Law of Treaties, 29 AJIL SUPP. 657–1226, 912–18 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft]. 
109 See, e.g., WALTHER SCHÜCKING & HANS WEHBERG, DIE SATZUNG DES VÖLKERBUNDES: KOMMENTIERT 
655–60 (2d ed. 1924); Manley O. Hudson, Legal Effect of Unregistered Treaties in Practice, Under Article 18 of the 
Covenant, 28 AJIL 546 (1934); Jean Lambiris, Enregistrement des traités d’après l’article 18 du Pacte de la Société 
des Nations, in 7 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL & DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE (3D SER.) 697 (1926); PAUL 
FAUCHILLE, 1(3) TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 335–45 (1926); CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (2d ed. 1922); C. 
SEVENS, LE RÉGIME NOUVEAU DES TRAITÉS INTERNATIONAUX (1925); JEAN RAY, COMMENTAIRE DU PACTE DE LA 
SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS SELON LA POLITIQUE ET LA JURISPRUDENCE DES ORGANES DE LA SOCIÉTÉ 545–58 (1930); 
DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 374–92 (Gilbert Gidel trans., from 3d Italian ed. 1929); L. 
OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 730–32 (A. D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928); GEORGES SCELLE, 2 
PRÉCIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: PRINCIPES ET SYSTÉMATIQUE 484–88 (1934); Ladislas Reitzer, L’Enregistrement 
des traités internationaux, in REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 67 (1937); EDOARDO VITTA, LA 
VALIDITÉ DES TRAITÉS INTERNATIONAUX 238–47 (1940). 
110 There were at least two cases in which the PCIJ adjudicated matters arising under an unregistered treaty, 
although in both cases, at least one party to the unregistered treaty was a non-member, and the instruments were 
well-known to the League, which might have made non-registration politically, if not legally, trivial. In further 
cases, the special agreement conferring jurisdiction was itself not registered. For details see Hudson, Legal Effect, 
supra note 109, at 552.  
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Assessing the Renegotiation of Article 18 	
Debates in the League and the wider legal community left the terms of Article 18 intact, 
but introduced informal qualifications to its interpretation, and indicated that it would not be 
strongly enforced. This tacit renegotiation of Article 18 was driven in part by realpolitik 
concerns: governments’ perception of a practical need for secrecy, and the Secretariat’s 
difficulties in enforcing compliance.111 However, one can also see in the various League bodies 
doubts at the level of principle, particularly concerning financial relations: was secrecy always 
inimical to peaceful relations, or was it, in fact, necessary to maintain them?  
These early responses to Article 18 challenged the intuition that publicity and legal force 
went hand in hand. Much depended on the vision of law at stake. The 1920 Secretariat 
Memorandum had sought to entrench publicity as a condition of legal force, and this approach, 
which would have cast doubt on the reliability of secret undertakings, was probably the only path 
by which Article 18 could have changed behavior. However, this approach was premised on a 
major shift in international law, in which the League Secretariat held at least a formal role in 
bringing treaties into operation. This was difficult to reconcile with then-dominant 
understandings of international law, in which states decided both what treaty obligations to 
accept, and whether or not they needed to be published. As one jurist put it, Article 18 was “a 
case in which the generous impulse towards a more perfect international organization runs up 
against obstacles deriving from a deep-rooted status quo, and in which the principle stated does 
not correspond to the collective legal consciousness.”112  
Early struggles over the interpretation of Article 18 showed the law itself to be a complex 
instrument, rather than a neutral means of transforming the interstate order. Not only did the 
deep structure of the law of treaties weigh against making registration and publication a 
condition of binding force; but, as the Franco-Belgian accord showed, the complex vocabulary of 
treaties, together with crafts of drafting, created avenues for secrecy. Moreover, the transposition 
of political condemnation of “secret treaties” into the realm of legal obligation arguably blunted 																																																								
111 Resource constraints may have dissuaded the Secretariat from trying to increase submission rates over time: 
even after a block subscription/subsidy organized by Manley Hudson and channelled through ASIL in 1923–24, 
there were ongoing struggles finding funds for proofreading and printing the Treaty Series. 
112 VITTA, supra note 109, at 247.  
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the impetus for change. What had appeared a clear objective—all treaties must be public—
became entangled in debates that were so complex and technical as to dissuade public 
engagement.  
 
III. INTERWAR EXPERIMENTS: ENTRENCHMENT OF PUBLICITY, REFINEMENT OF SECRECY 
 
Domestic Law and Bureaucratic Practice 	
Once the force of Article 18 had been called into question, domestic law constituted the 
major constraint on treaty practice.113 In France and the United States, there were no major 
changes to the constitutional position of the pre-war years. In Britain, on the other hand, the first 
Labour government sought in 1924 to introduce a constitutional requirement for parliamentary 
approval, or at least opportunity for discussion, of all treaties prior to ratification.114 Cecil Hurst, 
the FO legal adviser, discouraged any move toward requiring parliamentary approval, and 
suggested that publicity, and thus some measure of democratic control, could be accomplished 
by simply laying treaties once signed, instead of after ratification.115 The new policy was 
signaled by a statement by the foreign secretary in the House of Commons, that “every Treaty” 
would be laid, when signed, for twenty-one sitting days, before ratification.116 After a brief 
suspension when the Conservatives returned to power (1924–29), this “Ponsonby rule” was 
gradually entrenched as a convention.117 However, the focus on treaties requiring ratification 
may have obscured the non-publication of treaties not subject to ratification. Hurst had believed 
that such “international agreements, usually of a technical or administrative character . . . do not 
as a rule raise political issues, nor do the public at large or the Legislature desire to be bothered 
																																																								
113 There was still some disagreement about whether a failure to satisfy the demands of domestic law affected 
the validity of a treaty under international law. See Harvard Draft, supra note 108, at 996–1008. 
114 Ponsonby to Hurst, Feb. 1, 1924, FO 372/2114 [T1291/1291/381]. 
115  Hurst, Submission of Treaties to Parliament before Ratification, Feb. 5, 1924, FO 372/2114 
[T1291/1291/381] [hereinafter Hurst, Submission of Treaties].  
116 HC DEB., supra note 45, at vol. 171, col. 2003 (Ponsonby, Apr. 1, 1924). Ponsonby’s statement had referred 
to the need to capture “agreements, commitments, and understandings by which the nation may be bound . . . 
although no signed and sealed document may exist,” but this aspiration was largely forgotten in the years to come. 
117 Subject to a capacity to set it aside at Cabinet discretion in urgent cases (Parliament to be informed 
thereafter). For subsequent refinements of Parliamentary procedure, see Evans and Anderson, The Presentation of 
Treaties to Parliament: The Ponsonby Rule, Mar. 31, 1969, paras. 17–24, FCO 53/81 [“FCO” in archival references 
denotes National Archives (UK), Foreign & Commonwealth Office papers (held at Kew)]. 
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with them,”118 but it was not always the case that such treaties were devoid of political 
significance. 
In all three states, approaches to registration appear to have been shaped not only by 
domestic law, but by bureaucratic structures and processes. As the United States was never a 
member of the League, U.S. publication practice was relatively unaffected by Article 18. At least 
some “executive agreements” were considered treaties capable of binding the state under 
international law,119 and a new Executive Agreements Series was launched alongside the Treaty 
Series in 1929, but some executive agreements were not published.120 Manley Hudson, who 
worked in the League’s Legal Section during U.S. summers even after leaving full-time service 
in 1921, brokered an arrangement in 1925 whereby the United States would send treaties 
appearing in the Treaty Series to the League Secretariat, to be “entered” (but not registered). 
When another signatory was a League member, the Secretariat would seek submission from 
them of the text for actual registration, and only later, if no submission was forthcoming from the 
member, print the text provided by the United States in the League of Nations Treaty Series 
(LNTS), under a system of numbering distinct from that used in the main series.121 This 
procedure delayed the publication in the LNTS of U.S. treaties. From 1934, again following 
Hudson’s activism,122 the United States agreed to submit treaties for registration like any League 
member, but on the condition that the United States was not thereby acquiescing in the 
stipulation of Article 18 that no instrument be binding until registration.123 Although the 1934 
arrangements were not explicitly limited to treaties already published in the Treaty Series or 
Executive Agreements Series, there is no indication that officials contemplated sending to the 
Secretariat any texts which they would not otherwise have published.  
Within the British Foreign Office, the Treaty Department was responsible for both the 
integrity of internal records and the transmission of texts as appropriate to Parliament and the 
League. These tasks were mutually reinforcing, and officials had a certain pride in the accuracy 																																																								
118 Hurst did, however, comment on the difficulty of making ex ante distinctions between important and 
unimportant treaties. Hurst, Submission of Treaties, supra note 115. 
119 See, e.g., discussion in Harvard Draft, supra note 108, at 696–98. 
120 WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at xii–xiii (1941).  
121 Manley O. Hudson, Registration of United States Treaties at Geneva, 28 AJIL 342, 344 (1934). 
122 On Hudson’s personal involvement, see Hudson to Avenol, Feb. 1, 1934, LNA R3826 [3D/9266/2084]. 
123 Correspondence excerpted in Hudson, Registration of United States Treaties at Geneva, supra note 121, at 
344–45. 
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of their work, making them (usually) voices in favor of registration. In the French MAE, on the 
other hand, there was no ongoing treaty series akin to those in the United States and United 
Kingdom (treaties requiring promulgation simply appeared in the general Journal Officiel), and 
this may have been both a symptom and a cause of relatively limited attention to publication. 
Moreover, the task of registration was given initially to a new League liaison service within the 
ministry, rather than the services usually responsible for the custody of treaties (Protocol and 
Archives), and this dispersal of roles may have contributed to the marginalization of registration. 
In 1928, it was conceded that “until now, and it is a matter which Mr Fromageot [the legal 
adviser] has raised several times, we have often neglected to complete this formality of 
registration.”124 It was only in 1928 that it was laid down that, once the decree of promulgation 
had been published in the Journal Officiel, the treaty would be sent for registration. Texts not 
published in the Journal Officiel, of which there were apparently a considerable quantity (see 
further below), were not to be sent for registration, other than on specific instructions.125 
 
Techniques of Secrecy 	
The interwar period saw common techniques in Britain and France for the preservation of 
secrecy where this was considered desirable, including recourse to texts of ambiguous status, and 
packages of layered texts. However, there were differences in national styles. The French MAE 
was more inclined to rely on a general exception for “technical” texts, which was highly flexible, 
albeit legally plausible insofar as it reflected gradations of importance and detail that had long 
lain beneath the positivist notion of treaty.  
In Britain, the Law Officers’ 1921 opinion, mentioned above, articulated exceptions to 
Article 18 on which the Treasury and Board of Trade leaned heavily.126 Many agreements 
settling claims, or for the sale of surplus material, were not registered or published in the Treaty 
Series, although these may have been regarded as outside the scope of treaties in any event. A 																																																								
124 Note pour Monsieur Berthelot, [Enregi]strement des traités, May 1, 1928, with handwritten annotations by 
Fromageot, MAE SDN 20 [IA.4/3]. 
125 Id. 
126 See supra text at note 81. Beckett, then second legal adviser, thought the Law Officers’ opinion “not 
altogether convincing.” Minute Beckett, Jan. 19, 1933, FO 371/15927 [C5374/455/62]. He clarified: “The real test is 
the nature [rather than the form, or manner of conclusion] of the agreement. . . . If the agreement is one which is 
intended to create binding legal obligations under international law, it should be registered.” Minute Beckett, Mar. 9, 
1933, FO 371/16630 [C77/77/3]. 
Version prior to final type-setting: for final version see 111(3) AJIL (2017). 	
	 32 
large number of borderline texts concerning administration of reparations, not actually referred 
to in the opinion, were treated as analogous.127  
The FO tolerated secrecy in other circumstances, accommodating it through texts of 
indeterminate status, or the old drafting technique of splitting commitments between a 
(published) principal text and a (secret) ancillary text. The former approach is exemplified by a 
1927 “Record of Conversations” between the British ambassador in Rome; the governor of the 
Italian colony of Eritrea; and the director-general of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.128 
This rather convoluted text, referred to later as the “Rome Understanding,” stated that the 
delegates:  
 
acting under their instructions that the respective policies of the two Governments in 
Southern Arabia and the Red Sea should be pursued in a spirit of friendly co-operation 
and developed on parallel though independent lines, have reached the conclusion that 
their Governments are in agreement on the following points . . . .129 
 
One clause recorded that “His Britannic Majesty’s Government regard it as a vital 
imperial interest that no European Power should establish itself on the Arabian shore of the Red 
Sea” and that Italy, in view of possessions on the west coast of the Red Sea, had an equivalent 
interest.130  
When the signed texts arrived in the FO, the initial instinct was to submit them for 
registration, but some doubted whether they constituted an “international engagement.”131 The 
secretary of state preferred not to submit them, on the basis that this “might create an undesirable 																																																								
127 See, e.g., an Anglo-Uruguayan agreement of 1927, expressed as being between the two governments, 
providing for the handing over to the Reparations Commission of certain German-flagged ships requisitioned by the 
government of Uruguay during the war and the handling of expenses related thereto. The Treasury resisted 
registration on the basis that “[t]he Agreement is not of course a Treaty, but an executive arrangement for dealing 
with reparation deliveries, such as is made by various Powers every few months.” Waley to Troutbeck, Jan. 14, 
1927, FO 371/12128 [C 416/119/18]. In the FO, an official noted: “It is awkward, but there must be a considerable 
number of such agreements that we have not registered, and in some cases have not seen. . . . It is difficult to draw 
any artificial distinction between what we ought to register . . . and what we need not . . . .” Minute Ritchie, Jan. 21, 
1927, FO 371/12128 [C 416/119/18]. The agreement was not submitted for registration by Uruguay either. 
128 Enclosure in Graham to Chamberlain, Mar. 11, 1927, FO 371/12236 [E1369/22/91]. 
129 Id.  
130 Id., para. 4. 
131 Ritchie thought it was not; another official retorted: “It has the appearance of being an international 
engagement.” Osborne and Oliphant characterized it as a “gentlemen’s agreement,” meaning, in this context, not 
legally binding. Minutes Mar. 30, 31, and Apr. 1, 4, 1927, FO 371/12236 [E1369/22/91]. 
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precedent.”132 This decision was received in the Treaty Department as a legitimate reading of 
ambiguous texts in circumstances where the line between treaty and “gentleman’s agreement” 
was hard to draw. Yet when the FO looked again at the texts a decade later, as an expansionist 
Italian policy in the Yemen seemed more threatening, the earlier judgments seemed questionable. 
It was feared that any public assertion of British interests would ultimately lead to discovery by 
members of Parliament (MPs) of something they “might regard as a secret agreement.”133 On 
one hand, it was argued internally that 
 
there is nothing “secret” about the Understanding in this sense. It was a purely informal 
agreement, in the nature of diplomatic discussions and correspondence, and at the time 
there seemed no more reason to publish it than to publish any other part of the 
correspondence passing between His Majesty’s Embassy and the Italian Government.134  
 
But this was not quite true. From the outset the texts had struck some officials as having 
the quality of an “international engagement.” The formality of two languages, the finality of the 
statement of a mutually shared position, and the significance of the content had seemed to 
indicate a legally binding commitment. On the other hand, the carefully chosen wording 
(“parallel though independent policies”) and the “conclusion that [the] Governments are in 
agreement” tended to suggest a mere statement of fact about the governments’ beliefs. 
Regardless of whether the failure to submit the texts for registration had been technically 
defensible, officials knew that fine distinctions between engagements and gentlemen’s 
agreements would not be intelligible or convincing to Parliament.135 
An alternative technique for accommodating secrecy involved splitting obligations across 
a (published) principal and (secret) ancillary text. Where issues were important, and the 
government feared that the other party might renege on anything agreed in secret, officials 																																																								
132 Minute [illegible], Apr. 8, 1927, FO 371/12236 [E1369/22/91]. 
133 Draft Memorandum for the Middle East (Ministerial) Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
Future Policy in regard to the Yemen [c. July 1937], FO 371/20781 [E3941/872/91]. 
134 Id. 
135 Eden eventually stated the British aspect of the Understanding in the Commons: “It has always been, and it 
is to-day, a major British interest that no great Power [including Britain] should establish itself on the Eastern shore 
of the Red Sea.” HC DEB, supra note 45, at vol. 326, col. 1805 (July 19, 1937). The existence of written terms was 
kept secret even after this point, and inquiries discouraged. See minutes [illegible], Oct. 6, 1927, and Oct. 12, 1927, 
FO 371/20781 [E5795/872/91]. 
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insisted on publication of ancillary texts, reasserting a relationship between publicity and legal 
force.136 On other occasions, the United Kingdom did accept secret ancillary texts, the terms of 
which had some claim to binding force through their relation to the principal text.  
Secret ancillary texts were particularly prevalent in relations with polities which, while 
nominally independent, were within a British sphere of influence. While the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
of Alliance of 1930, for example, was registered and published, it was nestled among exchanges 
of notes and side letters “interpreting” the treaty, only some of which were published.137 The 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was a prelude to transition from British mandate to a new form of 
internationally brokered “independence” as informal empire,138 and the notes and letters were 
often crafted to preserve an appearance of independence and symbolic prestige.  
One note concerned a special guard, consisting of Iraqi troops under British officers, for 
the protection of British air bases in Iraq (British air force presence having been a major source 
of tension in negotiations).139 It was understood that the note would not be registered or 
published, but the Embassy in Baghdad contended that  
 
[i]t was . . . made perfectly clear at the time that Nuri’s note, or secret letter as it is 
generally called, would be binding on the Iraqi Government as faithfully describing “such 
conditions as may be agreed to between the High Contracting Parties” [referred to in 
para. 4] of the Annexure to the Treaty of 1930.140  
 
The secret text was thus not legally binding in its own right, but provided further details of a 
binding and public obligation into which it was arguably merged.  																																																								
136 See, e.g., insistence on publication of Anglo-Persian notes concerning jurisdictional arrangements for a naval 
facility on Henjam island. This would involve “loss of face” to the Persian Government (Clive [Tehran] to FO, Sept. 
3, 1930, FO 371/14528 [E4773/20/34]). However, it was considered vital that these notes be published in order to 
avoid difficulties with local officials. Flint (Admiralty) to Under Secretary of State, FO, Sept. 12, 1930, FO 
371/14528 [E4932/20/34]. Some officials rejected the absolute position that unregistered notes could not be invoked 
as a legal engagement, but the primary concern in doing so was to avoid making statements which might encourage 
the Persian Government to flout undertakings made in regular diplomatic correspondence. Minute Rendel, Sept. 11, 
1930, FO 371/14528 [E4773/20/34].   
137 Treaty of Alliance Between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of 
Iraq, with an Exchange of Notes . . . Together with Notes Exchanged Embodying a Separate Financial Agreement, 
UK Treaty Series No. 15 (1931), Cmd. 3797.  
138 SUSAN PEDERSEN, THE GUARDIANS: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE CRISIS OF EMPIRE 262–86 (2015). 
139 Said to Humphrys, June 30, 1930, FO 371/14508 [E4557/41/93]. 
140  Chancery, British Embassy Baghdad, to FO Eastern Department, Dec. 13, 1934, FO 371/17858 
[E7692/190/93].  
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Four years after the signature of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance, a new Iraqi government sought 
to publish some of the 1930 correspondence. As with the Anglo-Italian “record of conversations” 
discussed above, looking with fresh eyes at the correspondence prompted questions. An official 
observed that “the dividing line between some of these notes . . . and an ‘international 
engagement’ which should be registered . . . is rather thin.”141 Fitzmaurice, the assistant legal 
adviser, noted that “it would obviously be misleading” to submit the treaty for registration 
without accompanying notes if the notes “place a special meaning on [a] clause . . . different 
from that which an ordinary reader might assume from the terms of the treaty itself.”142 It was 
decided, however, that it was better not to register late, and to simply “brazen out” the earlier 
failure to register if it came to light.143 
The use of ancillary texts as an avenue for secrecy was also rife in the trade context, 
particularly as protectionist measures in the 1930s exacerbated struggles for commercial 
advantage. The FO thought “the growing [Board of Trade] habit of having their agreements in 
two parts, the innocent one for publication and the less innocent to be kept secret” was 
“reminiscent of the secret treaties which we have been trying to get away from since the war,”144 
and objected to the French practice of withholding agreements “by just labelling them 
‘administrative agreements.’”145 However, the Board of Trade argued that secrecy  
 
has become so widespread in other countries that we have found it impossible to avoid 
the infection . . . most of our trade agreements contain confidential letters . . . perhaps the 




141 Minute Nicoll, June 5, 1934, FO 371/17858 [E3214/190/93]. See also minute [illegible], June 13, 1934, FO 
371/17858 [E3214/190/93] (“I confess to feeling some doubt about the propriety of not publishing these notes. They 
may not be of first class importance + some of them may merely extend a previous arrangement but they appear to 
constitute international obligations.”). 
142 Minute Fitzmaurice, Sept. 4, 1934, FO 371/17858 [E3214/190/93]. 
143 Id. 
144 Minute Troutbeck, Oct. 19, 1936, FO 371/19760 [A8272/59/2]. 
145 Minute [Collier], Oct. 31, 1934, FO 371/18294 [N5961/1148/30]. 
146 Brown [Board of Trade] to Cadogan, Oct. 28, 1936, FO 371/19760 [A8582/59/2].  
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The Board of Trade in turn felt inhibited from complaint about other countries’ practices because 
“their own consciences are not entirely clear.”147  
In Britain, then, possibilities for secrecy subsisted, but secrecy tended to be 
accommodated only for matters of apparently secondary importance (however politically salient 
in reality). It was only as the international situation darkened in the late 1930s—a time when 
fascist powers were entering into secret treaties foreshadowing war148—that Britain resorted to 
secret commitments in the realm of high politics.149  
The French MAE undoubtedly left unpublished and unregistered many of the sorts of 
reparations, trade and financial agreements which also escaped publication in the United 
Kingdom,150 but went further, keeping secret a series of “military accords” made between 
France, on one hand, and the “Little Entente” (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia), on 
the other. These military arrangements, aimed at reinforcing the continental status quo and 
fostering military collaboration, were more obviously politically salient.  
Drafting followed loosely the precedent of the Franco-Belgian military accord, with one 
or more public texts (often termed “political”), and military stipulations in an ancillary text 
(sometimes described as “technical”) not intended for publication or registration. In 1921, for 
example, France and Poland entered into a “political accord” and a “military accord.” The 
political accord was signed by the respective foreign ministers; the military accord by ministers 
of war; and an annex to the military accord by generals and (in the French case) the minister of 
finance.151 The political accord contained very general provisions committing France and Poland 
to cooperation in matters of foreign policy and economic recovery, and providing that if one 
party suffered an unprovoked attack, the two governments would cooperate for the defense of 
their territory and legitimate interests. The military accord, styled as being “in execution of” the 																																																								
147 Minute [Grey?], Oct. 30, 1934, FO 371/18294 [N5961/1148/30].  
148 Most notoriously, the Molotov–Ribbentrop “Treaty of Non-Aggression” of Aug. 23, 1939, accompanied by a 
secret additional protocol defining respective “spheres of influence” that carved through Polish territory and the 
Baltic states. NAZI-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1939–1941: DOCUMENTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN 
OFFICE 76–78 (Raymond Sontag & James Beddie eds., 1948). 
149 The published Anglo-Polish Agreement for Mutual Assistance of August 1939, for example, provided that 
each party would at once give all the assistance in its power to the other party should it be subject to aggression or 
threats to independence by a “European power.” A secret protocol, said to constitute an integral part of the 
Agreement, specified that “European power” meant Germany. It was publicly acknowledged in 1939 that German 
aggression was the main source of concern (HC DEB, supra note 45, at vol. 352, col. 1082 (Butler, Oct. 19, 1939)), 
but the protocol was not published until 1945: Cmd. 6616 (1945).  
150 See, e.g., correspondence about various agreements in MAE 118 CPC 216 [Z760/5–6] (Yugoslavia); MAE 
110 CPC 225–6 [Z586/5–6] (Romania). 
151 See 1 DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS 1921, at 215–19, 235–36 (2004). 
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political accord, contained more concrete commitments to cooperate should Germany or Russia 
take particular steps, and provisions requiring Poland to develop its national forces, including by 
instituting two-year compulsory military service, and maintaining a peacetime strength of a 
certain number of divisions.152 France undertook to contribute military credits to the sum 
specified in the annex. The general staffs undertook to keep each other informed of preparations 
and measures necessary to the execution of the accord and the maintenance of lines of 
communication between the countries.  
The political accord was to be published almost in its entirety.153 The military accord and 
its annex were not to be published at all.154 Despite the variation in signatories, it seems to have 
been assumed that the texts all bound the French state as such (rather than ministers or generals 
personally). Internally, the French analogized this case to the Franco-Belgian episode, in which 
registration of only the covering letters had been accepted.155 The League Secretariat registered 
the political and commercial accords without posing any questions.156 A similar pattern, albeit 
with less firm and detailed military components, was followed for arrangements between France 
and other members of the Little Entente.157  
Internal French documents suggest that diplomats and MAE officials understood the 
secret military accords and other ancillary texts to have legal force, as far as they went. It was 
occasionally noted that the Franco-Polish annex on military credits was an agreement of a kind 
which, under the constitution, was not valid unless approved by the legislature,158 but there was 
no attempt to grapple with this fact. Admittedly, officials conceived of obligations in a holistic 
way, and rarely tried to disentangle those having force on legal grounds from those whose force 
was derived from, for example, a moral requirement to adhere to undertakings once made, or 
considerations of national self-interest. There was not scrupulous compliance with all terms of 																																																								
152 It was later acknowledged that the structure of the Franco-Polish accord was artificial: “[A]lthough it was 
signed only by military delegates of the two countries, [the military accord] was not only a [c]onvention of military 
execution [convention d’exécution militaire]; it comprised a series of articles of a genuinely political character as 
they determined the cases in which the cooperation of the two countries must be effected.” Note pour le Président du 
Conseil, Jan. 29, 1922, MAE CPC 132 [Z698/12&13]. 
153 Minus an article providing that it would only come into force on the execution of commercial accords then 
under negotiation. This article was withheld out of fear that Polish critics of the arrangements might read the article 
in question as confirmation that France’s pursuit of economic interests had dominated the whole relationship. 
Panafieu to MAE, Mar. 5, 1921, MAE CPC 132 [Z698/12&13]. 
154 Note pour le Président du Conseil, supra note 152. 
155 Note, Feb. 14, 1923, MAE CPC 133 [Z698/12&13, no. 133]. 
156 See 2 LNTS 128. 
157 Details in Donaldson, supra note 23, 369–73. 
158 See, e.g., Note pour le Président du Conseil, supra note 152. 
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the secret texts, any more than the public ones. Nevertheless, officials invoked secret texts as a 
source of obligations in internal correspondence, and discussions with foreign counterparts.159 
Internal lists of France’s treaties, alliances, and “contractual obligations” referred to both public 
and secret texts, mentioning which had been published and which had been secret but not 
otherwise suggesting that the secret texts lacked legal force.160 In a draft speech for the French 
foreign minister, which originally claimed that French relations with friendly countries of East 
and Southeastern Europe “remain founded on public accords which do not threaten anyone and 
in no way limit the development of peaceful relations between their signatories and the other 
States of Europe,” the word “public” was carefully struck out by hand.161 Other countries, 
including Britain, knew or suspected that the secret texts existed, and incorporated them into 
assessments of relations between the various countries. 162  This might merely reflect the 
insignificance of distinctions between legal and extra-legal obligation, particularly in the military 
context, but it also suggests that no sharp distinction was made between the legal force of public 
and secret texts.  
Despite the elaborate drafting, the existence of military commitments did not actually 
remain secret in any of these cases. The undertakings made in the Franco-Polish military accord 
required domestic legislative action in both states (in Poland, the institution of two years’ 
compulsory service, and in France, the grant of military credits) that was difficult to reconcile 
with secrecy.163 The French Senate Finance Committee demanded a copy of what it believed 																																																								
159 E.g., the French speak of the need for clauses of the Franco-Polish military accord to be executed “strictly 
and without delay,” and the Poles, upset about French delays in granting military credits, insist that the engagement 
to supply the credits had been entered into by the French without qualification or reserve and must be kept. Président 
du Conseil to Foch, Aug. 31, 1921, MAE CPC 132 [Z 698/12&13]; Note pour le Président du Conseil, supra note 
152. See also Foch to Président du Conseil, July 1, 1921; Président du Conseil to Foch, Aug. 31, 1921; Ministre 
plénipotentiaire of Poland in Paris to the Ministre des Affaires Étrangères (France), Mar. 24, 1922 (original 
erroneously marked 1921); Président du Conseil to Ministres de la Guerre and others, Mar. 31, 1922; Note, 
Négociations Franco-Polonaises, Application de la Convention Militaire, Apr. 26, 1922; all MAE CPC 132 [Z 
698/12&13] (concerning Poland’s obligations to reorganize its army and extend military service, and France’s 
obligations to extend the credits); Note sur les échanges de vues et les accords de la Pologne avec les états de la 
Petite Entente et de l’Entente baltique, May 28, 1923 (concerning Poland’s obligations to inform France of treaties 
negotiated with other states); Warsaw to MAE, Aug. 14, 1924 (concerning France’s obligations to concert with 
Poland); both MAE CPC 134 [Z 698/12&13]. 
160 See, e.g., État des traités et des accords d’alliance, May 1, 1928; Notes sur les accords politiques franco-
polonais, Nov. 24, 1937; Obligations contractuelles de la France et de la Tchécoslovaquie, Nov. 27, 1937; MAE 
CPC 479 [Y61/4].  
161 Projet de texte pour le discours du Ministre, Jan. 18, 1939, MAE CPC 479 [Y61/4]. 
162 See, e.g., Memorandum: Political Treaties, Agreements, Alliances and Relations at present in force in 
Central and South-East Europe affecting the Question of Security, Jan. 20, 1925, FO 371/10698 [C982/982/62]. 
163 Note pour le Président du Conseil, supra note 152.  
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was a “financial convention” underpinning the military credits, but was actually the military 
accord and its annex.164 The Polish minister in London observed that “this accord had been 
drafted most clumsily,” and proposed replacing it with a text which would mention a loan 
without specifying the military aspect.165 Further deliberation was short-circuited when the 
Frankfurt Gazette published a summary of the (public) political and (secret) military accord. The 
conclusion of clusters of public and secret instruments with Czechoslovakia and Romania were 
also followed by press rumors or disclosures. In responding to press and public criticism, 
statesmen and officials could exploit the ambiguous status of ancillary, secret texts, and shift 
between a broad lay notion of “treaty” and narrower senses common in diplomatic discourse, but 
not widely shared by the public.166 
 
The Interwar Legacy 	
Article 18, as the first norm of treaty publication in international law, did have 
considerable effects. Most League members submitted at least some of their international 
engagements for registration,167 and the rhetorical embrace of publicity inherent in Article 18 
gave domestic legislatures and publics a new benchmark against which to criticize secrecy. 
Nevertheless, Article 18 was not able to achieve the definitive split it promised on its face, 
between a universe of legally binding obligations, all of which would be registered and 
																																																								
164 Note pour le Président du Conseil, June 24, 1922, MAE CPC 133 [Z698/12&13]. 
165 Visite du Ministre de Pologne à M. de Peretti, Feb. 1, 1922, MAE CPC 132 [Z698/12&13]. 
166 E.g., publication in a German newspaper of what purported to be the text of a secret Franco-Czech military 
treaty, but was actually a fake, turned out to be a gift for the French and the Czech governments. They could happily 
issue démentis, and Benes declared before the Czech Foreign Affairs Committee that he had not, and would not in 
the future, sign any “secret treaties.” See Ministre de France, Prague, to Président du Conseil, Mar. 22, 1924, MAE 
CPC 42 [Z864/12]. The démenti was amplified in the Francophone press. See extracts in dispatches in MAE CPC 42 
[Z864/12]. 
167 In the first full year of the League’s operation (1921), 128 treaties were submitted for registration. The figure 
grew rapidly in the mid-1920s to 350 (1926), before tapering in the late 1920s. These figures are from Manley O. 
Hudson, The Registration of Treaties, 24 AJIL 752, 753. This certainly does not represent the totality of treaties 
made by League members, or even published in national collections. Raw figures on the number of treaties 
submitted are a very inadequate proxy for national compliance, but in the period 1920–1930 the British Empire 
submitted the most treaties, followed by Germany, then Scandinavian and some European countries (the United 
States was not submitting treaties for registration at this stage: see above text at note 121). France submitted 
considerably fewer treaties than the United Kingdom. There were relatively strong submission figures from some of 
the new states of eastern Europe, perhaps reflecting the close engagement of some of these states and their leaders 
with the League, but comparatively few submissions from Latin America; thirteen submissions each from China and 
Siam; and four from Persia. Id. at 754–55.  
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published; and a hinterland of secret obligations which, whatever their hold in interest or honor, 
had no legal significance. 
Experience in the 1920s and 1930s suggested, even to proponents of publicity, that the 
connections between publicity and the ideals it had been intended to serve were more attenuated 
than anticipated. While perhaps necessary for democratic control of foreign policy, the norm of 
treaty publication was far from sufficient to secure this end. As even Ponsonby came to 
acknowledge, opportunities for debate in Parliament were rarely taken up.168  The relation 
between publicity and peace had already been questioned in the 1920s, when secrecy about some 
interstate financial dealings seemed conducive rather than damaging to peace, and in the 1930s, 
secrecy of military accords came to seem, at least to the “status quo” powers who had emerged 
victorious from WWI, essential for defense and the stability of the international order.  
The relationship between the norm of publication and the fostering of legality in 
interstate relations was also highly complex. The basic intuition that legal obligations were, or 
should be, public had gone hand-in-hand with a new, institutionalized vision of international law. 
This had been countered by a voluntarist tradition in which states remained the ultimate arbiters 
of their obligations to each other, and the extent to which these obligations would be rendered 
public.  
The vision that the norm of treaty publication would change the conditions of interstate 
interaction, and help to construct a more law-governed international order, also came under 
pressure. The norm probably did contribute to the wider dissemination, and possibly thus the 
systematization and coherence, of international law, by establishing the League of Nations 
Treaty Series as a unitary repository of authenticated and translated texts. But whether it 
entrenched a deeper orientation to legality in governments was difficult to say. The fact that 
some secret treaties made arrangements for conduct in violation of international law tends to 
reinforce the notion that secrecy and power politics went together, in opposition to publicity and 
respect for law. On the other hand, many secret treaties did not contemplate action in violation of 
law. Indeed, precisely because they were secret, and signatories lacked an institutional and 
rhetorical apparatus for their enforcement, some secret treaties might actually be seen as a mark 
of faith in the power of legal obligation alone to guide states’ conduct.  
																																																								
168 HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATES, 5TH SER., vol. 86, cols. 793–94 (Feb. 22, 1933) [hereinafter HL DEB]. 
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There are indications that the norm of publication empowered a broader range of states as 
legal actors, vindicating formal sovereign equality over informal hierarchy. One striking 
illustration is furnished by dealings in the 1920s between Britain, France, and Italy regarding 
respective rights in Ethiopia. Frustration on the British side with Ethiopian reluctance to accept a 
dam project essential for development in the Sudan drove Britain to enter into a 1926 exchange 
of notes with Italy, whereby each would support the other in seeking desired concessions from 
the Ethiopian government. The regent of Ethiopia, Ras Tafari, heard of the agreement, and 
protested that he “[did] not understand why the two Governments [had] contracted together to 
consider action inside the jurisdiction of Ethiopia before we heard anything about it.”169 The FO 
and Italian counterparts toyed with various possibilities, including splitting the agreement into 
secret and public parts,170 but the necessity of registration and publication, in light of Ethiopia 
and parliamentary interest in the agreement, made it clear that dissembling over the text itself 
would be unwise.171 The parties settled for only minor alterations before showing the text to Ras 
Tafari.172 
In reinforcing national publication practices, Article 18, together with the existence of the 
League as a platform, made a tangible difference to Ras Tafari’s possibilities of resistance. 
British MPs asked probing questions about the intent behind the exchange and, while their 
criticisms were often stymied, as the government repeatedly rejected interpretations of the letters 
by MPs and the press, they drove Chamberlain to issue an explicit denial of any coercive 
intent.173 In July 1926, Ras Tafari sent a letter to the League, duly circulated to League members 
and published, contrasting his belief that “all nations were to be on a footing of equality within 
the League, and that their independence was to be universally respected” with the seeming 
reality of Anglo-Italian collusion. This did not force the withdrawal of the notes altogether,174 
																																																								
169 Ras Tafari to Bentinck, Jan. 26, 1926, enclosure 1 in Bentinck dispatch, Jan. 28, 1926, FO 371/11561 
[J497/19/1]. 
170  See, e.g., correspondence in FO 371/11560 [J363/19/1, J447/19/1]; FO 371/11561 [J458/19/1]; FO 
371/11562 [J847/19/1]. 
171 See, e.g., Graham to Chamberlain, May 7, 1926, FO 371/ [J1137/19/1]. 
172 Correspondence in FO 371/11562 [J1207/19/1]. 
173 HC DEB, supra note 45, at vol. 197, col. 1614 (July 5, 1926); see also vol. 197, col. 1120 (June 30, 1926).  
174 Although Ethiopia could, in theory, have argued that they were contrary to the undertaking given by 
members under Article 20 of the Covenant that “they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with 
the terms thereof.” 
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but caused Britain and Italy to disclaim formally any intention to “reserve” any part of Ethiopian 
territory.175  
Historically, Ethiopian rulers had been bound by treaties which they were sometimes 
unable to read themselves, and European governments had exploited linguistic ambiguities in 
correspondence to which Ethiopian rulers had had limited access.176 League procedures ensured, 
at least, that the Ethiopian Government would have access to the actual texts, and could contest 
their terms on a footing of formal equality. On the other hand, it did not change the underlying 
dynamics of power relations or avert Italian expansion in the long term.  
Finally, while Article 18 reflected a strategy of using law to entrench publicity, the law 
itself continued to complicate the underlying project. Aside from the deep structural concerns 
which had limited the interpretation of Article 18, diplomatic crafts of drafting and 
terminological subtleties central to the law of treaties had enabled officials to preserve margins 
for secrecy without making them obvious to legislatures and the public. Publics in the 
democracies surveyed here remained deeply concerned about “secret treaties” throughout the 
interwar period. The revelation of leaked or forged “secret treaties” produced periodic press 
scandals. Yet there was a diminishing sense that the public might ever discover the truth of what 
was occurring. Admittedly, the subtleties surrounding understandings of “treaty,” “agreement,” 
“understanding,” and the like could trap officials as well as confuse publics. Sometimes 
instruments which were never intended to have legal force attracted suspicion, and the 
terminological complexity left governments unable to convey the innocent or trivial nature of the 
transactions at stake. Overall, though, the complexity of the vocabulary probably weakened faith 
that the true picture could be known, and thus dissuaded public engagement.  
 
IV. THE DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER, C. 1945–1949 	
Although wartime conditions in 1939–45 interrupted the usual course of both 
international and domestic treaty publication, the United States and the United Kingdom, at least, 
assumed that the treaty publication requirement would be reintroduced in some form after WWII. 																																																								
175 See correspondence published in 7 LNOJ 1524–25 (1926). 
176 See, e.g., Sven Rubenson, The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichalē Treaty, 5 J. AFR. HIST. 243 (1964); 
Sven Rubenson, Professor Giglio, Antonelli and Article XVII of the Treaty of Wichalē, 7 J. AFR. HIST. 445 (1966) 
(on the disputed clause in an 1889 treaty, used by Italy to claim a protectorate over Ethiopia).  
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Eleven other, mostly small, states raised the issue in their responses to the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals.177 However, in 1945, general interest and faith in publicity was weaker than it had 
been a generation earlier. The norm of treaty publication was perhaps associated with an 
idealism which was seen to have failed. Moreover, the connections between multilateralism, 
international organization, and publicity, influential in the design of the League, were weakened 
in the transition to a new international organization. The Security Council was envisaged as 
wielding centralized military force, which would give it greater powers to police state conduct 
without relying on publicity, and would require the United Nations itself to maintain regimes of 
military and intelligence secrecy. 
American officials played a decisive role in the crafting of what would become Article 
102 of the Charter.178 Although figures like Hudson had been consistently supportive of the 
League of Nations Treaty Series, and keen that it continue in some form, American officials in 
San Francisco distanced themselves from the Article 18 precedent. They observed that the word 
“every” in “[e]very treaty or international engagement” had, “by interpretation and in practice, 
lost most of its significance,” and that the apparent sanction of invalidity for unregistered treaties 
had been “weakened,” principally by the PCIJ’s failure to apply it.179 More fundamentally, they 
believed that the sanction “probably did not achieve the original aim of suppressing agreements 
inconsistent with the peace of nations.”180 The State Department’s legal adviser preferred not to 
include in the Charter any sanction for non-registration.181  
The U.S. draft, from which the Committee worked, imposed an obligation to register 
“treaties and international agreements”: an arguably narrower class of texts than might have been 
caught by the reference to “international engagement” in Article 18.182 The draft listed two 
alternatives for the second paragraph. One was akin to the second sentence of Article 18, and the 
other was a provision to the effect that organs of the Organization could “disregard” unregistered 																																																								
177 3 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 
1945, at 149, 222–223, 327, 342, 389, 526, 540, 560 (1945).  
178 American officials involved in the work of Sub-Committee IV/2/A: Other Legal Problems, the body tasked 
with drafting what would become Article 102, included Charles Fahy, Philip Jessup, and Henry Reiff (U.S. State 
Department), together with Manley Hudson (present in Sub-Committee IV/2/A as an informal observer, but whose 
views likely carried great weight because he had been so involved in U.S. policy on treaty registration). 
179 ISO 165, Nov. 22, 1944, 4, 5, PCJ I:166. [“PCJ” in archival references denotes Philip C. Jessup papers, 
Library of Congress (Washington, DC)]. 
180 Id. at 7.  
181 Views of [Green Haywood Hackworth], May 10, 1945, PCJ I:166. 
182 US IV/2/A Doc. 5, May 18, 1945, 1, PCJ I:176. For text of Article 18, see supra note 2. 
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treaties. Although some small states, including New Zealand and the Philippines, supported the 
former, a combination of the U.S. proposals, Hudson’s interventions, and British support 
managed to champion the latter, providing that UN organs could choose to disregard 
unregistered treaties.183 This was similar to the Anzilotti/Drummond view of the interwar years. 
When others raised the difficulties involved in leaving the status of a treaty to ad hoc 
determination, particularly if the Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) took 
different approaches,184 Hudson intervened and expressed the fear that an absolutist provision 
like Article 18 would be interpreted in light of PCIJ precedent, and thus involve no sanction at 
all.185  
Article 102 eventually provided that  
 
Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member . . . shall as 
soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it. 
 
No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered . . . 
may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations. 
 
Article 102 was, on its face, open to the same interpretive controversy as Article 18: did it 
impose an absolute obligation to register, or merely stipulate the consequences that would follow 
from a failure to do so? The first sentence of Article 102 suggested the former interpretation, but 
some invoked the limited sanction to suggest the latter.186 On the latter interpretation, states 
could create secret obligations which were legally binding inter se, provided they accepted that 
																																																								
183 US IV/2/A Doc. 6, May 19, 1945, 2–3, PCJ I:176. 
184 Id. at 3 and Corrigendum; US IV/2/A Doc. 7, May 21, 1945; PCJ I:176. Article 102 in fact gave rise to a host 
of difficulties. On a literal reading, a non-party to an unregistered treaty could invoke the treaty before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), whereas a party could not; and a party could invoke an unregistered treaty 
before, say, an arbitral tribunal or domestic court, but not the ICJ. See, e.g., Ernst Martens, Article 102, in 2 THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 2089, 2105–06 (Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg 
Nolte, Andreas Paulus & Nikolai Wessendorf eds., 3d ed. 2012); Michael Brandon, The Validity of Non-registered 
Treaties, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 186, 198–99 (1952). 
185 US IV/2/A Doc. 7, May 21, 1945, 1, PCJ I:176. Jessup thought there “seem[ed] to be no satisfactory 
explanation” of why the PCIJ had ignored Article 18. Jessup to Fahy, May 13, 1945, 2, PCJ I:166. 
186 See, e.g., Wilhelm Karl Geck, Treaties, Registration and Publication, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 490, 494 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984) (suggesting that “the watering down of the sanction” 
relative to what Article 18 had provided might have “contributed to a weakening of the binding power of the 
obligation to register”). 
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they could not invoke these obligations in UN fora. Other aspects of the Charter drafting also 
weakened the Covenant’s model of centralized supervision over treaty-making.187  
By 1945, there had been no further clarification of the terms “treaty” or “international 
agreement.”188 This left a certain ambiguity about the reach of Article 102, even aside from the 
limited nature of the sanction. At San Francisco, the drafting committee had discussed an explicit 
exception for agreements between individual states and the Security Council about military 
forces (then envisaged as part of an international military force which never eventuated).189 
However, this exception had been abandoned because it was expected that subsequent 
“regulations” would confine the reach of Article 102. 190  The FO and State Department 
contemplated trying to include in the General Assembly resolution concerning implementation of 
Article 102 some limitation of the classes of texts requiring registration (in the FO case, by 
transposing some version of the exclusions identified in the Law Officers’ opinion),191 but this 
failed, and the resolution ultimately just deferred to “experience and practice” to set its 
bounds.192 In an early concession to the growing role of international organizations as legal 
actors, that resolution did make clear that “treaty or international agreement” included 
agreements between UN member states and specialized agencies. The resolution also set out an 
alternate procedure (“filing and recording”) for certain texts that were deemed not to come 
within Article 102, notably agreements between the UN and non-member states, the UN and 
																																																								
187  Article 14, the successor to the Covenant provision concerning the Assembly’s power to advise 
reconsideration of treaties (see supra text at note 32), was given a more general ambit. Article 103 preserved the 
preeminence of Charter obligations over inconsistent treaty obligations. However, as with Article 20 of the 
Covenant (see supra text immediately following note 32), doubts about the nature and scope of the registration 
obligation hindered the sort of comprehensive oversight of treaty obligations needed to ensure that Charter 
obligations did in fact prevail over conflicting commitments.  
188 Note the haphazard terminology in Charter Articles 43, 57, 62(3), 102, 103, and 105(3); and ICJ Statute 
Articles 34(3), 35, 36, 37, 38(1)(a), and 63. For scholarly discussion, see, e.g., Michael Brandon, Analysis of the 
Terms “Treaty” and “International Agreement” for Purposes of Registration Under Article 102 of the United 
Nations Charter, 47 AJIL 49, 55–56 (1953); J. E. S. Fawcett, The Legal Character of International Agreements, 30 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 381 (1953). Suggested exclusions from the term “treaty” begged more questions. Denys P. 
Myers, The Names and Scope of Treaties, 51 AJIL 574, 598, 600 (1957). 
189 US IV/2/A Doc. 7, supra note 184, at 3; Doc. 8, May 24, 1945, 2; PCIJ I:176. 
190 EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF 
THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 154 (June 26, 1945); see also Foreign Office, A Commentary on the Charter of 
the United Nations, Cmd. 6666, para. 74 (1945).  
191 Minute Beckett, Nov. 7, 1946, FO 372/4847 [T21331/4751/581]. 
192 GA Res. 97(I) (Dec. 14, 1946), as modified by GA Res. 364 B (IV) (Dec. 1, 1949); 482 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950); 
33/141 A (Dec. 18, 1978).  
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specialized agencies inter se, and the UN or specialized agencies and other inter-governmental 
bodies.193 
Importantly, the resolution required a party submitting a treaty for registration to certify 
that the text was a true and complete copy thereof and included all reservations. The UN  
Secretariat thus considered that “[i]t was not permissible simply to register a treaty and to 
withhold any confidential exchange of letters which might, in fact, modify its substance.”194 
Although an analogous requirement had existed in the League Secretariat’s 1920 Memorandum, 
it had not been made central to debates over Article 18, and the UN Secretariat’s position seemed 
to signal a stricter approach than had been taken to texts like the Franco-Belgian military accord.  
In echoes of the interwar experience, however, early compliance with Article 102 was 
patchy. Attempts to articulate the strongest possible reading of even the limited terms of Article 
102, and to foster compliance, were hampered by institutional constraints within the Secretariat 
(which was unable to confront permanent members of the Security Council), and the fact that 
even some strong advocates of registration felt vulnerable to attack over their own past practice.  
In the Sixth Committee, the USSR seized on an observation by the Committee Chair that 
Article 102 did not impose an absolute obligation to register, but merely outlined the 
consequences of not doing so (a position rejected by a number of other states, including the 
United States, Britain, and France).195 The FO contemplated from time to time whether Article 
102 might be more energetically enforced, particularly against the USSR.196 In 1949 an official 
in London noted that:  
 
after several battles in the Sixth Committee, it has been agreed to differ, and Article 102 
is gradually losing its force. We do not yet say in public, however, that we are not 
prepared to register all agreements. . . . It could be added confidentially that we have not 
recently been beyond reproach ourselves.197  																																																								
193 See discussion in Aron Broches & Shirley Boskey, Theory and Practice of Treaty Registration with 
Particular Reference to Agreements of the International Bank, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, <8>ICSID<8>, 
AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 107 (Aron Broches ed., 1995). 
194  5 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS [1945–1954], at 286–87, available at 
http://legal.un.org/repertory/art102.shtml.  
195 See A/C.6/SR.54 (meeting of Oct. 29, 1947). In subsequent years Russian delegates participated in 
discussions in the Sixth Committee in a manner which the FO believed was a tacit admission of obligation to 
register. Southern Department to British Legation, Budapest, Dec. 19, 1950, FO 371/87810 [RH10338/11 1950]. 
196 See, e.g., Heathcote-Smith, Mar. 10, 1947, FO 372/6099 [T4383/383/381].  
197 Minute [Hildyard?], Jan. 9, 1949, FO 371/77445 [N11004/1138/30].  
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Britain reaffirmed its view internally that Article 102 imposed an absolute obligation to 
register,198 but had by this time experimented with new techniques of secrecy (outlined below), 
and had been implementing some troubling secret agreements, including one requiring the 
(sometimes forcible) repatriation of liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom.199 Though 
this agreement predated the Charter and was thus not required to be registered, its 
implementation proved morally disturbing, and created difficulties under domestic law, meaning 
there were incentives to avoid provoking mention of it by the USSR.200 
 
V. SECRET TREATIES IN THE POST-1945 WORLD 	
Domestic Law and Bureaucratic Practice, c. 1945–1990 	
In the decades following WWII, all three states examined here continued to permit the 
making of treaties (in the international law sense) which remained unpublished. In the United 
States, the experience of wartime governance, and the knowledge that the Senate’s rejection of 
the Treaty of Versailles a generation earlier had weakened the League system, motivated 
arguments that the president had authority to make treaties under international law by a process 
other than the two-thirds majority approval of the Senate required for “treaties” within the 
meaning of Article II of the Constitution. 201  Scholarship and jurisprudence had already 
recognized “executive agreements” pursuant to an existing treaty or legislation, and in exercise 
of the president’s constitutional powers.202 Post-1945 developments would help to articulate 
more clearly a further variant: agreements subject to expedited approval or implementation, not 
																																																								
198 Southern Department to British Legation, Budapest, supra note 195. 
199 Copy in FO 371/57287 [U3903/1730/70]; referred to but not reproduced in 1 DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH 
POLICY OVERSEAS (SERIES I) 73, n. 2 (Rohan Butler & M. E. Pelly eds., 1984). 
200 See, e.g., correspondence in FO 371/47897 [N3670/409/38]. 
201 For opposing cases, see, e.g., MCCLURE, supra note 120; Edwin M. Borchard, American Government and 
Politics: Treaties and Executive Agreements, 40 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 729 (1946). “Executive agreements,” even 
those grounded in the constitutional authority of the president alone, had now been held to have the same supremacy 
over state law as Article II treaties. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324 (1937).  
202 See supra text at notes 119–20.  
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by the Senate, but by a majority in both Houses, and subsequent approval by the president.203 
Such “Congressional–executive” agreements, like Article II “treaties,” would necessarily be 
subject to the publicity associated with the legislative process. Executive agreements pursuant to 
existing treaties or legislation, or under the president’s constitutional powers, on the other hand, 
while usually published, could be withheld from publication. A State Department circular of 
1955 clarified the Department’s view of the power to make executive agreements;204 reiterated 
an undertaking by the secretary of state to consult with Congressional leaders and committees, if 
circumstances permitted, where any serious question arose as to whether a given agreement 
should be treated as an Article II “treaty,” or as an executive agreement on one basis or another; 
and mandated certain notifications to and consultations with the State Department in the course 
of negotiations.  
In the United Kingdom, the Ponsonby rule remained the only “constitutional” limit on the 
Crown’s treaty-making powers. This rule did not apply to a large class of treaties made in a form 
not requiring ratification. These were sometimes laid for twenty-one days, especially where there 
was public interest, but not in all cases of important agreements.205 It remained the practice to 
publish treaties in the Treaty Series whether they were laid in Parliament or not, but this was not 
legally required. It was acknowledged internally that “one often finds that politically most 
important things are done by instruments which come into force on signature only . . .”206 and 
governments insisted on discretion regarding the choice of form.207 As in the interwar period, 
focus on the Ponsonby rule may have distracted attention from the question of whether treaties 
not subject to ratification were published at all.208 																																																								
203 For a detailed account, see, e.g., Ackerman and Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 
866–96 (with reservations as to the notion of a “constitutional moment”). On increasing recourse to the executive 
agreement, see GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 
37–46 (2009). 
204 Department of State Circular No. 175, para. 3 (Dec. 13, 1955), reproduced in 50 AJIL 784 (1956). With 
some variation of expression, this categorization of the constitutional bases for executive agreements remains in 
place today. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§119–21 (1965); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §303 (1987); 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 723.2-2(A)–(C) (rev. 2006), 
available at https://fam.state.gov/default.aspx#. 
205 Evans and Anderson, The Presentation of Treaties to Parliament: The Ponsonby Rule, Mar. 31, 1969, FCO 
53/81. 
206 Minute Beckett, Nov. 30, 1948, FO 372/6727 [T24653/24653/381]. 
207 HL DEB, supra note 168, at vol. 180, col. 1285 (Swinton, Mar. 11, 1953).  
208 See response to a parliamentary question in 1945, asking for an assurance that no agreement will be 
concluded until it has been “confirmed” by Parliament. While initial proposals for a response mentioned that the 
government must retain a discretion not to publish some agreements, the final answer turned on the Ponsonby rule. 
Minute [Robb?], Nov. 2, 1945, and final response, FO 370/1194 [L3470/3470/402]. 
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The initial French post-war constitution preserved the requirement for legislative 
approval of a specific list of treaties, but removed the requirement for the president to inform the 
legislature of all treaties “[a]s soon as the interest and safety of the state shall permit.” A 1953 
decree gave the MAE exclusive responsibility (as against other government departments) for the 
ratification (if necessary) and publication of all “conventions, accords, protocoles et règlements 
internationaux” to which France was a signatory, or by which France was engaged. This decree, 
however, only required publication in the Journal Officiel of instruments of a nature which 
would affect private rights and duties.209 The 1958 Constitution distinguished between “traités” 
(i.e., in this context, texts subject to ratification or analogous process) and “accords 
internationaux” (i.e., in this context, international agreements not subject to ratification or 
analogous process).210 It provided, as under earlier constitutions, that the president “negotiate 
and ratify” traités, and be kept informed of all negotiations leading to the conclusion of an 
international agreement.211 Again, only a closed list of specific kinds of treaties and international 
agreements required legislative approval and associated publicity. Any treaty not falling within 
these categories, and not intended to take effect within domestic law, or affecting private rights 
and duties, might be kept secret by the executive indefinitely.  
 
Familiar Techniques of Secrecy in a Changing World 	
In some respects, officials navigating publicity requirements after WWII were moving in 
a world rather different to that of the 1930s. The United States’ ascendance to global influence 
gave the U.S. government new influence over publication practice. The UK, on the other hand, 
experienced a rapid decline, and sometimes sought the face-saving secrecy she had formerly 																																																								
209 Decree No. 53-192, Mar. 14, 1953, [1953] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE: LOIS 2436, 
Art. 3, available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000491782&categorieLien=id. An arrêté 
of June 16, 1955 required the Service des Archives to maintain a record of all international engagements, of 
whatever nature. France resumed publication of a regular treaty series in 1958, with the RECUEIL DES TRAITÉS ET 
ACCORDS DE LA FRANCE, but this seems primarily to have reproduced texts already published in the Journal Officiel. 
A separate project to publish all bilateral treaties and accords made since 1567 and still in force, published or 
unpublished, was pursued in the 1970s, beginning with 1 RECUEIL GÉNÉRAL DES TRAITÉS DE LA FRANCE. 1ER SÉRIE. 
ACCORDS BILATERAUX PUBLIÉS ET NON PUBLIÉS AU JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE (1564–1957) 
(Roger Pinto & Henry Rollet eds., 1979). 
210 Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp. 
211 In practice, many “traités” (in the narrow sense—i.e., subject to ratification or analogous process) are in fact 
not ratified by the president, but “approved” by the government. PAUL REUTER & PHILIPPE CAHIER, INTRODUCTION 
AU DROIT DES TRAITÉS 78, n. 97 (3d ed. 1995). 
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bestowed on others. The United Nations played a greater role as a site of contestation over 
compliance than the League had done, in part because Cold War adversaries embraced the 
United Nations as a platform. While the Soviet government had not complied with Article 102, 
American celebration of democracy and openness left NATO governments vulnerable to 
accusations of hypocrisy for any failure to register. Overall, greater international cooperation, 
including the proliferation of transnational functional cooperation not channeled through foreign 
ministries, increased the scale of treaty-making and challenged foreign ministries’ institutional 
control over treaty-making processes (a phenomenon reflected in periodic attempts, discussed 
below, to reassert foreign ministry consultation and oversight). 
That said, there were important continuities in the general areas in which secrecy was 
deemed desirable, particularly trade (especially before the advent of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) and defense (where the development of atomic weapons, and the 
formalization of military and intelligence cooperation amid Cold War hostilities contributed to 
an institutionalization of bureaucratic secrecy well beyond the treaty context).212 While the scale 
of post-WWII decolonization would mark a major break from the interwar order, treaty relations 
between former colonial powers and post-colonial states, exemplified in the French case 
explored below, often showed an interweaving of public and secret commitments of a kind seen, 
for example, in interwar dealings between Britain and Iraq. 
Where there was a felt need for secrecy, diplomats and officials fell back on some of the 
techniques seen earlier: crafting packages of texts, some for publication and some not; and 
maintaining ambiguity about the legal status of particular texts. Persistent questions about legal 
status arose in particular in connection with recourse to “inter-agency” or “inter-departmental” 
agreements, concluded by agencies or departments in their own name with foreign counterparts 
rather than in the name of the relevant governments.213 Though acknowledged earlier (for 
example, by the British Law Officers’ reference to agreements not arranged through 																																																								
212 New systems of information classification, extended and generalized beyond the military context, do not 
seem to have been reconciled conceptually with requirements for treaty publication. Rather, texts arrived in foreign 
ministries subject to classification (if at all), and foreign ministries had to either find ways to justify their secrecy 
within the norms pertaining to treaty publication, or press for revision of the classification.  
213 A highly significant, if unique, instance was the Anglo-American “Communication Intelligence Agreement” 
of March 5, 1946, signed by representatives of the U.S. State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, and 
the London Signal Intelligence Board, each of which was said to represent multiple departments and agencies. This 
Agreement, and its 1955/56 successor, consolidated wartime intelligence and cryptanalysis cooperation, and laid the 
foundations of the “Five Eyes” program (documents available at https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-
documents/ukusa/index.shtml).  
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“diplomatic” channels”),214 these agreements proliferated after WWII, creating possibilities for 
secrecy, but also challenging foreign ministries’ control of international commitments in ways 
that would ultimately demand correction.  
As before, British and American officials were inclined to enforce a legalistic approach to 
what was required to be published, whereas French officials, when they considered registration, 
seem to have assumed a capacious exception for “administrative” or “technical” agreements (a 
posture which probably reflected pre-WWII attitudes, but also precarious control of treaty texts 
following the disruption of the MAE and its records under Vichy and occupation).215 In all three 
states, fine distinctions made internally between different kinds of text, and the nuanced 
deployment of treaty terminology, were not well understood by legislatures or the public.  
For the United States, the key challenge in the early post-war years was reconciling 
Article 102 with the demands of a global military presence. The State Department resisted 
attempts to formulate blanket exceptions for agreements made by agencies other than foreign 
ministries, or dealing with defense and sensitive matters. Instead, officials held out the possibility 
of “distinguish[ing] between the substance of an agreement and mere administrative 
arrangements made . . . in implementation of it,”216 albeit on the basis that the latter must not be 
“integral parts” of the treaty or agreement.217  
The United States was willing to take the risk that secret treaties could not be invoked 
before the United Nations, but was concerned about exposure to criticism by the USSR. While it 
might be argued that Article 3 of the NATO Treaty and announcements of integrated defense 
																																																								
214 See supra text at note 81. 
215 Efforts in the 1950s to secure submission of original agreements to the Archives Service seem to have had 
only mixed success. De Gaulle’s discovery in the late 1950s that 1954 agreements between France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany had not been published in France helped “empty the drawers.” La Publication des 
engagements internationaux de la France, 8 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 888, 899 (1962). In 
1955 a Bureau des Traités was created within the Ministry, and the constitutional reform of 1958 prompted more 
regular procedures, but reminders suggest on-going difficulties. See, e.g., correspondence in MAE Direction des 
Archives 289 [1720–1970. Dossier général]. 
216 Foster, Registration of Treaties Under Article 102 of the UN Charter, May 9, 1947, NARA RG 59, 1945–49 
CDF, Box 2063 [501.AJ/Treaties/6-1947] [“NARA RG 59 . . . CDF” in archival references denotes National 
Archives and Records Administration, Reading Group 59, Department of State Central Decimal File (held in 
Washington, DC)]. 
217 Fahy, circular Registration of Treaties with the United Nations, June 19, 1947, NARA RG 59, 1945–49 
CDF, Box 2063 [501.AJ/Treaties/6-1947]. 
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forces gave “[t]he peoples of the world . . . notice, in broad terms, as to what is being done,” and 
met “the ‘public relations’ test,” this did not satisfy Article 102.218  
A memorandum reviewed possible techniques, and their limitations. Service-to-service 
agreements (a variant of the “inter-agency” agreements mentioned above) might arguably not 
constitute treaties or agreements captured by Article 102. However, governments and the U.S. 
Department of Defense “prefer the additional stability of a government-level agreement.”219 
Countries might work through bilateral institutions rather than treaties, creating bodies like the 
United States-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which would then make plans and 
decisions functionally equivalent to what might otherwise be dealt with by treaty. But this 
depended on the states involved having close working relationships. Finally, parties could reach 
principal agreements in broad terms, with classified annexes. This final option was seen, at least 
in the U.S. defense context, as preferable.220 The United States proposed this to other key NATO 
powers, and even contemplated making a public announcement of this policy, a course 
discouraged by French officials.221 In practice, some ancillary texts would drift beyond the 
position prepared for Congress, namely that “not all purely technical or administrative 
arrangements, such as details on staffing or equipping or manner of operation of bases 
established in implementation of the [NATO] Treaty, are published.”222 
Like the State Department, the FO deemed it acceptable to keep secret a strictly delimited 
set of ancillary texts: “a confidential letter, or agreed minute which explains in greater detail the 
effect of the published document,” or “embod[ies] understandings which are not intended to 
constitute international obligations . . . but . . . are rather declarations of policy or of attitude.”223 
Such texts were used in the defense context, sometimes in ways which strained the limits 
imposed by the FO. A notorious example is the secret exchange of notes between the U.S. 																																																								
218 Registration of Defense and Base Rights Agreements with the UN, Dec. 1, 1951, NARA RG 59, 1950–54 
CDF, Box 1263. 
219 Id. 
220 US-UK agreements regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom, however, were typically not framed 
as treaties. See SIMON DUKE, US DEFENCE BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A MATTER FOR JOINT DECISION? 
(1987) (giving history of negotiations).  
221 In view of the possible propaganda use which might be made of it by the USSR. Note pour le Président 
Schuman, Mar. 17, 1952, MAE NUOI 596 [S50.5.2] [“MAE NUOI” in archival references denotes Archives 
diplomatiques (France), “Nations Unies et Organisations Internationales” series (held at La Courneuve)]. 
222 Questions and Answers” prepared in connection with hearings over the Bricker Amendment, NARA RG59 
Department of State Lot Files, Lot 79 D 273, Box 5 (emphasis added).  
223 Dunbar to [various government departments], July 23, 1946, FO 372/4847 [T10754/4751/381]; see also 
minute Beckett, Mar. 1, 1947, FO 372/6099 [T383/383/381].  
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ambassador in London and the secretary of state, accompanying the published 1967 agreement 
regarding U.S. rights on Diego Garcia. 224  The secret exchange made arrangements for 
concealment of associated expenses, including for compensation of existing colonies from which 
the territory was taken, from both the British and American legislatures. These notes 
“confirm[ed]” the “financial arrangements which have been reached,” by which was understood 
the position that the UK would meet these costs initially, and then be compensated for half of 
them by manipulating liabilities under an unrelated agreement concerning the Polaris missile 
program.225  
By 1950 the FO had developed a detailed list of exclusions to the definition of treaty, and 
thus to the set of texts it considered necessary to submit for registration.226 Some of these 
exceptions, like that for unilateral statements, and for agreements operating under municipal law, 
were congruent with prevailing understandings of the treaty under international law (even if 
somewhat stretched in practice). Others, like that for minutes of standing committees composed 
of national representatives (a device popular with the Board of Trade, but not the FO),227 and 
agreements subsidiary to and not materially altering a principal agreement,228 reflected more 
artificial pathways for secrecy. 
France seems to have been less preoccupied by the Article 102 requirement. Where 
secrecy was felt necessary, the government took advantage of the possibilities provided by 
domestic law. This is particularly evident in relations with former African colonies, including 
provisions, inter alia, for French intervention to maintain internal order. The felt need for secrecy 
in these instances may have emerged from a French desire to conceal details of military 
arrangements, or to avoid being pressed by other states to ratchet up support, but the main 
impetus for secrecy seems to have come from the new regimes’ concern to preserve at least a 
																																																								
224 Agreement on the Availability for Defence Purposes of the British Indian Ocean Territory, 603 UNTS 273 
(subsequently amended).   
225 The secret exchange, which came to light in the 1970s, to heavy criticism, is reproduced in PETER H. SAND, 
UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN IN DIEGO GARCIA: THE FUTURE OF A CONTROVERSIAL BASE 8 (2009).  
226  As reflected in, for example, circular Griffiths to colonial governors, Registration of International 
Agreements with the United Nations, May 2, 1950, FO 372/6968 [TF12/17 1950].  
227 See, e.g., correspondence in FO 372/6717 [T12897/1677/381]. 
228 For FO criticism of creative use in the trade context: minute Cox, June 28, 1948, FO 371/68917 
[UE5746/78/53]. 
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façade of independence (or, conceivably, anxieties about possible obstacles to UN membership 
arising from a perceived lack of independence).229 
Post-independence treaties with Cameroon offer a particularly clear example of the 
drafting strategies used to maintain secrecy. The suite of texts included a Treaty of Cooperation, 
annexing various published accords and conventions. At the same time, the same 
plenipotentiaries signed a secret defense accord, providing, inter alia, that the Republic of 
Cameroon could request France to provide, on conditions defined by further special accords, the 
assistance of French armed forces for the maintenance of internal order,230 together with various 
annexes (on aid and mutual facilities and strategic primary resources).231 Plenipotentiaries signed 
one protocol of ratification for all the public accords and a separate secret protocol for the 
defense accord. 232  This was possible under both the French Constitution and the new 
Cameroonian constitutional framework, which referred to the making of “agreements [accords] 
and treaties” but provided only for “treaties” to be submitted to the National Assembly for 
approval prior to ratification.233 Texts forming part of the same cluster of transactions were thus 
sorted, by form and terminology, into public and secret.234  
Most of the post-1945 secret treaties and ancillary texts described thus far reflect a 
gradual systematization of a secrecy that could be cultivated within and through law, or at least 
in the complex relations between the law of treaties, and the diplomatic crafts of drafting. Yet 
there were also instances of radically irregular “secret treaties,” like the “Protocol of Sèvres” 																																																								
229 On Cold War-era challenges to UN admissions on the basis of lack of independence, see Ulrich Fastenrath, 
Article 4, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 341, 344–45 (Bruno Simma, Daniel-
Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus & Nikolai Wessendorf eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
230 This echoed earlier, short-term secret agreements made pre-independence, and used for operations against 
the “Union des Populations du Cameroun,” a dynamic and transnationally active resistance movement which sought 
the unification of French and British Cameroon before independence. See MEREDITH TERRETTA, NATION OF 
OUTLAWS, STATE OF VIOLENCE: NATIONALISM, GRASSFIELDS TRADITION, AND STATE BUILDING IN CAMEROON 2–11 
(2014). 
231 Note pour le Service du Protocole, Dec. 22, 1960, both in MAE Afrique-Levant 1953–1959/Cameroun/10 
[Accords franco-camerounais 1960–62] [hereinafter MAE Cameroun 10]. The “accord de défense” was sometimes 
characterized as a secret annex to the Treaty of Cooperation, and sometimes as freestanding. The final text is now 
available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/traites/affichetraite.do?accord=TRA19600199. 
232 Benart to MAE, Nov. 16, 1961, in MAE Cameroun 10, supra note 231. 
233 The French understanding was that the secret defense accord could be ratified without Parliamentary 
approval under the Cameroonian Constitution because it was not a “treaty” within the meaning of the constitutional 
text, although internal French correspondence refers to an article which does not seem to bear directly on the 
question. Note a/s. Instruments de ratification des accords franco-camerounais du 13 novembre 1960, Jan. 12, 1961, 
MAE Cameroun 10, supra note 231. 
234 This and subsequent texts were treated as classified. TIBAULT STÉPHÈNE POSSIO, LES ÉVOLUTIONS RÉCENTES 
DE LA COOPÉRATION MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE EN AFRIQUE 150, 429–433 (2007) (on subsequent texts). 
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(1956),235 settled outside the usual machinery of foreign policymaking and envisaging conduct 
in breach of international law.236 The Protocol was in part a response to Nasser’s nationalization 
of the Suez Canal, and an effort to check Nasser himself, who was thought to be a conduit of 
Soviet influence in the Arab world. It provided for an Israeli attack on Nasser’s Egypt, following 
which Britain and France, ostensibly onlookers to the operation, would issue appeals to both 
sides to withdraw troops from the Canal zone, and press Egypt to accept temporary occupation 
by Anglo-French forces.237 The Protocol was, in substance, a secret offensive alliance, one of the 
very phenomena that proponents of publicity had aspired to eliminate.  
On one view, the secrecy of the Protocol was tangential, as the nefariousness of its 
contents placed it outside the register of law altogether. There is an inherent contradiction in 
appealing to law to hold other parties to an undertaking to behave unlawfully. Translated into 
doctrinal terms, one might argue that there could not have been, in the circumstances, an 
intention to create legal relations at all.238 That said, there are indications that at least some of the 
signatories considered the Protocol to have legal force. The text, drafted by French and Israeli 
officials, had characteristics reminiscent of a treaty. Drafters had intended for it to have a 
preamble, but ran out of time to craft one. The text was signed by representatives of the parties, 
and referred to the fact that its provisions would enter into force [“entreront en vigueur”] after 
the agreement of the three governments (the delay being occasioned by the fact that the British 
signatory was a deputy under-secretary of state, who could only sign ad referendum).239 Israeli 
negotiators, who had requested preparation of the document, were keen for the political and 
symbolic prestige associated with signing a formal document of some kind (even in secret) as an 
																																																								
235 Reproduction of French original and English translation in S. Ilan Troen, The Protocol of Sèvres: 
British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956, 1 ISR. STUD. 122, 131 (1996). The originals were headed 
“Protocole” and “Protocol” respectively, and “Sèvres,” the location of its signature, was added to many subsequent 
references.  
236 The British Lord Chancellor had advised that the intervention was a lawful defense of British nationals and 
property (without commenting on the significance of the deception involved in its arrangement), but the attorney-
general and FO legal advisers, not consulted in advance about the plan reflected in the Protocol, disagreed after the 
fact. On the exchange of legal views as the situation developed, see Geoffrey Marston, Armed Intervention in the 
1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government, 37 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 773 (1988).  
237 See also a further Franco-Israeli agreement regarding air defenses in Troen, supra note 235, at 135. 
238 The later progressive development of the law in VCLT, Article 53, concerning a treaty in conflict with a 
peremptory norm, such as the prohibition of aggression, offers a different possibility for some such cases: there may 
have been a treaty, but one that was void ab initio. However, this position remains controversial, and may still not 
have attained customary status. 
239 CHRISTIAN PINEAU, 1956 SUEZ 152–53 (1976). 
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equal with major powers;240 and the French signatory, in his memoirs, did not exclude the notion 
that the Protocol was intended to have legal force.241 Subsequent letters confirmed the French 
and Israeli governments’ agreement to both “the result of the conversations of Sèvres and the 
terms of the final protocol to which they gave rise,”242 giving the Protocol a status independent 
of the conversations. The British prime minister, by contrast, was dismayed that the Protocol had 
been brought into existence at all, and tried to suppress all material trace of it.243 
We might see this behavior as reflecting the ubiquity of legal forms. Even where parties 
considered themselves to be making, at best, a “non-binding agreement,” they drifted by habit 
and training into forms characteristic of a treaty. Alternatively, it might speak to the endurance 
among some diplomats and statesmen of a radically voluntarist model of international law, in 
which states’ agreements inter se are thought to have some legal force despite being at odds with 
other undertakings, not least the UN Charter. To the extent this is the case, it highlights starkly 
the terrain left open once a failure to register (and thence have published) a treaty was deemed 
not fatal, in itself, to its legally binding status.  
 
New Trends in the Management of Secrecy, c. 1960s Onward 	
The law of treaties underwent major scrutiny in the 1950s–60s, culminating in 1969 with 
the VCLT. However, the codification process had relatively limited impact on publication. 
Crucially, the VCLT preserved the ambiguities over the outer bounds of the category of treaty 
which had been so central to the accommodation of secrecy.244 In stipulating the limited extent 																																																								
240 KEITH KYLE, SUEZ 326, 330 (1991); Avi Shlaim, The Protocol of Sèvres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot, 73 
INT’L AFF. 509, 522, 529 (1997). That said, a desire for a formal document is not in itself a belief that the document 
was legally binding.  
241 He observed later that it was an exaggeration to call the text a “treaty,” and that it was rather a “temporary 
agreement relating to a specific action” [“accord temporaire portant sur une action précise”], following completion 
of which the engagements have no further purpose. However, this observation does not exclude a supposition that he 
believed it to be legally binding as far as it went. PINEAU, supra note 239, at 149.  
242 Mollet to Ben-Gurion, reproduced from Ben-Gurion Archives in Troen, supra note 235, at 136. 
243 Requesting, unsuccessfully, that the French destroy their copy, and having all copies in British hands 
destroyed (Meetings at Sèvres 22–25 October 1956, Narrative, Donald Logan (24 October 1986), FCO 12/183; 
Meeting with Sir Donald Logan on Suez Records, 15 April 1986, FCO 12/178). Eden’s letter following the Protocol 
signing confirmed only that the British would “take the action described” in the Sèvres conversations, making no 
reference to the Protocol text (Eden to Mollet, as reproduced in Troen, supra note 235, at 137). The earlier written 
“declaration” by Eden to which reference is made in this letter has not been traced in British archives. JONATHAN 
PEARSON, SIR ANTHONY EDEN AND THE SUEZ CRISIS: RELUCTANT GAMBLE 150–151, 222, n. 43 (2003). 
244 See, e.g., Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism Versus Flexibility in the Law of Treaties, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 257, 261–74 (Christian J. Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulos & Andreas Zimmermann eds., 
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to which a failure to respect provisions of internal law, including requirements that treaties be 
laid before legislatures or published beforehand, might be invoked to invalidate consent, it left 
open the possibility that secret treaties might bind states even in circumstances where they had 
been made in violation of domestic law.245  
From the late 1960s, however, there were a number of changes to the management of 
secrecy in the three states surveyed here, driven primarily by democratic concerns and functional 
imperatives linked to the growing scale of treaty-making. This part sketches three such changes: 
(1) requirements for provision to the U.S. Congress of (and thus publicity for) executive 
agreements, some of which had escaped Congressional attention to date; coupled with public 
acknowledgement of the existence of a category of “classified agreements,” to be supplied only 
to House and Senate committees under injunction of secrecy; (2) efforts to grapple with the legal 
status of inter-agency agreements; and (3) formalization and elaboration of the genre of the “non-
binding agreement.” Avenues (1) and (2) further systematized a margin for secret, yet legally 
binding, texts, continuing the dual history of entrenchment of a norm of publication alongside 
preservation of possibilities of secrecy. Avenue (3) pushed secret arrangements out of the realm 
of legal obligations altogether, thus fulfilling the spirit of Article 18, but not in a way which 
definitively resolved the boundary between “treaties” and “non-binding agreements.”  
As the “vast sub-structure of intergovernmental paper” grew after WWII, the difficulty of 
distinguishing treaties from mere diplomatic correspondence became more acute. 246 
Congressional hearings in the late 1960s over contested issues of foreign policy brought to light 
that major allocations of funds and materiel, as well as representations about how the United 
States would conduct itself in particular contingencies, rested not only on Article II “treaties,” 
but rather on executive agreements of various kinds, including oral statements. While State 
Department officials were well-versed in diplomatic wording that conveyed distinctions between 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
2014). Lingering questions about the outer bounds of “treaty” are evident in the scholarship. See, e.g., Michel 
Virally, Sur la notion d’accord, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BINDSCHEDLER 159 (Rudolf Bindschedler, Emanuel 
Diez, Jörg Paul Müller, Heinrich Reimann & Luzius Wildhaber eds., 1980); Kelvin Widdows, What is an Agreement 
in International Law?, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 117 (1979); Pierre Michel Eisemann, Le Gentleman’s agreement 
comme source du droit international, 106 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 326 (1979). 
245 VCLT, supra note 3, Art. 46.  
246 The phrase is from R. R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite Variety,” 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 549, 
556 (1980).  
Version prior to final type-setting: for final version see 111(3) AJIL (2017). 	
	 58 
executive agreements and lesser texts, Congressional committees did not necessarily grasp these 
nuances, and nor did foreign governments.247 
Congressional concern about unchecked executive power over foreign policy spurred the 
Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, which required “any international agreement, other than [an Article 
II] treaty” to be reported to Congress within sixty days of entry into force.248 Any agreement 
“the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial 
to . . . national security” was to be transmitted only to House and Senate Committees on Foreign 
Relations under injunction of secrecy.249 The State Department interpreted the Act as further 
qualified by an inherent executive privilege which might permit the withholding of an otherwise 
reportable agreement.250 However, the Act did acknowledge the existence of classified executive 
agreements—secret treaties, in the international law sense—and provide limited Congressional 
oversight. In the United Kingdom and France, there was no equivalent explicit acknowledgement 
and, to the extent that secret texts were available to legislatures, this occurred, in all likelihood, 
only on an ad hoc basis.  
In the United States, efforts to implement the Case-Zablocki Act led to a reckoning with 
“inter-agency agreements.” Scholarly commentary had expressed doubts about the extent to 
which such agreements could bind the state, at least independently of some principal text made 
in the name of heads of state or government.251 In the United States, agencies did not always 
																																																								
247  See, e.g., negotiations with Spain 1969–70 for U.S. base rights, complicated by suspicion and 
misunderstanding of prior transactions. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements 
and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91 Cong., Part 11 (Mar. 11, 
Apr. 14, 1969; July 17, 1970) 2309–2311, 2322, 2388, 2342 (Evidence of Elliot Richardson) (1970).  
248 Pub. L. 92-403, §1, 86 Stat. 619 (Aug. 22, 1972), later reflected in 1 U.S.C. §112b (1982 comp.). This was 
subject to an agreed exclusion for “trivia.” 
249 An interview in June 1974 with a senior staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee indicated that 
5–10% of all “international commitments” (primarily those dealing with military policy) were classified. LOCH K. 
JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE 28, n. 11 (1984). 
250 Abshire to Weinberger, Aug. 18, 1972, NARA RG 59, Box 1959 [POL 4].  
251  See, e.g., Basdevant, supra note 21, at 624–25; Herbert Kraus, Système et fonctions des traités 
internationaux, 50 R.C.A.D.I. 311, 328–29, 352–54, 368 (1934); J. Mervyn Jones, International Agreements Other 
Than “Inter-State Treaties” — Modern Developments, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 111 (1944); J. L. Weinstein, 
Exchanges of Notes, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 205, 205–06, 215 (1952); PHILIPPE GAUTIER, ESSAI SUR LA DÉFINITION 
DES TRAITÉS ENTRE ETATS. LA PRATIQUE DE LA BELGIQUE AUX CONFINS DU DROIT DES TRAITÉS 228–50 (1993). On 
the constitutional basis of “agency level agreements” in the United States, see David J. Kuchenbecker, Agency-Level 
Executive Agreements: A New Era in U.S. Treaty Practice, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 21–31 (1979). Although 
the UK position accepted that departments could bind the state, it tended to see these agreements as limited to 
transactions of a private law character (which would not be treaties in any event). ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 20–21 (1961). 
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supply the texts of agreements to the State Department in a timely way, or at all.252 Recourse to 
such agreements thus undermined both Congressional oversight under the Case-Zablocki Act, 
and the ability of the State Department to exercise centralized control over U.S. commitments. In 
1976, the State Department clarified that it regarded “agency level agreements” as capable of 
binding the United States under international law, and as falling within the Case-Zablocki Act as 
long as they met certain criteria.253 The Act was modified in 1977 and 1978 to require all 
agencies to transmit agreements to the State Department within twenty days, with oral 
agreements to be reduced to writing and reported; and to consult with the State Department 
consultation, at least over certain categories of agreement, before signature.254  The State 
Department position on what was captured by the Act, and the obligations of other agencies, 
were incorporated in regulations in 1981, albeit subject to a stipulation that failure to comply 
with the regulation did not affect the validity of an agreement in domestic or international law.255  
In France, too, the perceived need for the foreign ministry to reassert control over 
increasingly dispersed transnational cooperation seems to have driven the adoption of circulars in 
the 1980s requiring that all persons signing international engagements have instruments of full 
powers, and that, once signed, texts be sent to the MAE.256 In the United Kingdom, although 
there had been discussion, for example, of the capacity of bodies like the Bank of England to 
enter into agreements with counterparts, the preference appears to have been to treat many 
“inter-agency” agreements as non-binding, and thus separate to some extent from the treaties for 
which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was administratively responsible.257 
If new developments on legislative oversight in the United States, and bureaucratic 
disciplines on inter-agency agreements, tended to formalize possibilities for secret yet legally 																																																								
252 Comptroller-General of the United States, U.S. Agreements with the Republic of Korea, ID-76-20 (Feb. 20, 
1976); Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives, 94 Cong. (June 22, 23, 29, 30; July 20, 22, 1976) 237–240 
(responses by the Hon. Monroe Leigh) (1976). 
253 Were intended to be legally binding and governed by international law; were not trivial; were between two 
or more parties; contained obligations of some degree of specificity; and were of a form to indicate an intention to 
be legally bound. Memo Monroe Leigh to Key Department Personnel, Mar. 12, 1976, reproduced in id., 240–43. 
254 Pub. L. 95-45, §5, 91 Stat. 224 (June 15, 1977); Pub. L. 95-426, Title VII, §708, 92 Stat. 993 (Oct. 7, 1978); 
reflected in 1 U.S.C. §112b (1982 comp.). 
255 46 FR 35918, July 13, 1981, as amended; see 22 C.F.R. §181.1(b). 
256 The circulars exempted “administrative arrangements which do not engage the State and bind only the 
administrations concerned,” though it is unclear how administrative departments alone could have the capacity to 
enter into binding arrangements. Geneviève Burdeau, Les Engagements internationaux de la France et les exigences 
de l’Etat de droit, 32 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 837, 843 (1986).  
257 On the British preference for memoranda of understanding (MOUs), see infra at note 261 and following text. 
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binding commitments, recourse to “non-binding agreements” offered an alternate means of 
securing secrecy (along with other benefits, like simplicity of negotiation and amendment). Such 
“non-binding agreements” were, in one sense, merely a continuation of nineteenth-century 
“gentlemen’s agreements.” However, the latter tended to be expressed in brief and sometimes 
personal terms, and rest on the honor of individual diplomats, whereas post-WWII arrangements 
could be lengthy and detailed, and purport to engage agencies, governments and the state rather 
than individuals.258 While non-binding agreements could be used for high-profile “political” 
commitments like the Helsinki Final Act,259 in which case they might be widely published, and 
even reproduced in collections of legal materials, they were of particular utility where states 
wished to avoid the publication requirements associated with treaties.260 
By the 1970s–80s, British practice and scholarship had developed a fine-grained account 
of the textual and other indicators differentiating a non-binding agreement (which came 
gradually to be labeled “memorandum of understanding” or “MOU”) from a legally binding 
treaty. Recourse to non-binding agreements appears to have been embraced in Britain and the 
Commonwealth even for arrangements which other states preferred to make in treaties.261 
However, the distinction between a treaty and a non-binding agreement has not always been 
clear, even among signatories. The British contention, in a major arbitration, that an 
intergovernmental MOU was not legally binding 262  seems to have surprised the U.S. 
government, and brought to the surface the fact that at least some of the MOUs which the United 
States regarded as treaties (in the international law sense) were not considered as such by the 
United Kingdom and Commonwealth states.263 There may still be instances in which the U.S. 
																																																								
258 Eisemann, supra note 244, 327–31. 
259 Final Act of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 ILM 1292 (1975). 
260 An early account of MOUs is Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 
35 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 787 (1986).  
261 For example, for the United States, demands of domestic statutory authorizations and appropriation 
processes, protection of private rights, and some additional prudential preference seems to have meant a desire to 
cast defense arrangements in legally binding terms where the United Kingdom was content to have them non-
binding. John H. McNeill, International Agreements: Recent U.S.–UK Practice Concerning the Memorandum of 
Understanding, 88 AJIL 821, 823 (1994). France, too, has generally opposed the notion of engagements entered into 
by governments and yet not legally binding. SECRÉTARIAT GÉNÉRAL DU GOUVERNEMENT & CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, 
GUIDE POUR L’ÉLABORATION DES TEXTES LÉGISLATIFS ET RÉGLEMENTAIRES 429–30 (version of Sept. 25, 2015), 
available at http://www.guide-legistique.fr/guide.pdf. 
262 United States—United Kingdom Arbitration Concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (1992–1994), 24 
U.N.R.I.A.A. 1, 131. 
263 McNeill, supra note 261, at 822; Jean-Pierre Plouffe, Les Arrangements internationaux des agences et 
ministères du Canada, 21 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 176, 186–90 (1983).  
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and UK governments take different positions on the status of particular texts.264 Whether this is 
an oversight or a tacit Atlantic “agreement to disagree” about legal status in certain problematic 
cases, it confirms again the porous and negotiable outer bounds of the “treaty” category. 
 
VI. THE SECRET TREATY TODAY 	
Today, Article 102 is considered to have customary status, and the Secretariat interprets 
“[e]very treaty and . . . international agreement” as any “written agreement governed by 
international law entered into by parties with the requisite treaty-making capacity.”265 However, 
practice suggests that states consider Article 102 to be something less than a comprehensive 
obligation to register all such texts.266 A stipulation that a given text is not to be registered may 
be an indication that the text is not a treaty, but this is not determinative; and the non-submission 
of a text for registration cannot be presumed to preclude it being a treaty. The ICJ has rendered 
																																																								
264 In the defense area, divergences were reconciled to some extent by the drafting of legally binding “chapeau 
agreements” in the 1990s, which would overlay non-binding MOUs (e.g., Defense Cooperation Arrangements 
Agreement, May 27, 1993, 1792 UNTS 145, 147). See AUST, supra note 7, at 39. The 2016 edition of “Treaties in 
Force” carried a statement that “in order to avoid confusion as to their legal character, this edition omits a number of 
non-binding instruments regarding defense cooperation that have been included in prior editions,” but still lists 
under the “Defense” category an exchange of letters relating to the safeguarding of classified information (Apr. 4, 
1961). See U.S. Department of State, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2016, at i, 459 (2016), available at 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267489.pdf. This exchange of letters is considered not legally 
binding by the UK government (communication to author from Treaty Section, Legal Directorate, FCO, June 23, 
2017).  
265  Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supplement No. 9, at 7, available at 
http://legal.un.org/repertory/art102.shtml. As part of work on “Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule 
of Law Activities,” the secretary-general was asked by the General Assembly in 2016 to review the regulations 
giving effect to Article 102. He recommended, inter alia, that the Sixth Committee consider revisions, including a 
review of the substantive conditions for registration (but did not propose any particular approach). See Strengthening 
and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities: Report of the Secretary-General, para. 25, A/71/169 (July 
20, 2016). The Sixth Committee has proposed to take note of the recommendations. General Assembly, Sixth 
Committee, Draft Resolution: The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, para. 8(b), A/C.6/71/L.27 
(Nov. 7, 2016). 
266  Based on figures given in the Supplements to the Repertory of Practice (available at 
http://legal.un.org/repertory/art102.shtml), the number of treaties submitted for registration by states has climbed 
from roughly 5,000 in 1960–69, to roughly 8,000 in 2000–09, but this is not remotely equal to the total number of 
treaties and international agreements made. It seems likely that much of the non-compliance is due to bureaucratic 
incapacity in state ministries, but in some cases states appear to be operating on a principle of registering only, or 
mostly, treaties they consider to be of particular importance. In many cases treaties are registered after significant 
delay, indicating perhaps declassification or correction of oversights, or anticipation that the government may wish 
to invoke a treaty before a UN organ. The overall rate of registration, judging very roughly from the experience of 
compilers of Rohn’s World Treaty Index, is probably about 50%. Glenda J. Pearson, Rohn’s World Treaty Index: Its 
Past and Future, 29 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 543, 546–47 (2001).  
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decisions based on interpretations of unregistered treaties. 267  Even as many aspects of 
international law and interstate interaction are subject to greater transparency, a central mode of 
generating legal rights and obligations in the international system remains free of any 
comprehensive publication requirement. 
Dominant interpretations of Article 102, together with the limited attention to 
enforcement, mean that domestic law requirements and bureaucratic pathways probably remain 
the strongest determinants of publication. Domestic law requirements have strengthened since 
the early twentieth century, but in ways that preserve possibilities for secrecy—albeit refined and 
limited over time. Of the three states considered here, the United States is most forthright in 
asserting the existence of a category of secret treaties, in the form of “classified agreements.” 
Article II treaties, and most executive agreements, are published or at least made publicly 
available, 268  and thence submitted for registration. “Classified agreements,” or classified 
ancillary texts to published agreements, are not published or submitted for registration, but are 
provided to the foreign relations committees of the Senate and House (unless deemed subject to 
executive privilege).269 
France occupies a middle ground, insofar as there is a requirement to publish all treaties 
and agreements, but one that acknowledges some instances in which this will not be possible. 
Certain categories of treaty are required by the 1958 Constitution to be submitted to the 
legislature. An amended version of the 1953 decree still requires publication in the Journal 
Officiel only of treaties of a nature which would affect private rights and duties,270 though a 																																																								
267 In several cases (Corfu Channel, Asylum, Minquiers and Ecrehos, Monetary Gold, and Anglo-Iranian Oil) 
the ICJ referred to unregistered treaties without mentioning Article 102 (although the texts concerned had been 
made public in some form). See Broches and Boskey, supra note 193, at 130–144, 152–153. In Case Concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1994 
ICJ REP. 112, the jurisdiction of the ICJ was said by Qatar to rest on a 1987 exchange of letters, which both parties 
considered constituted “an international agreement with binding force in their mutual relations,” and minutes of a 
meeting in 1990, which Bahrain contended were merely a record of negotiations, and Qatar contended rose to the 
level of a treaty. The ICJ held that non-registration or late registration did not warrant an inference that there was no 
intention to create legal relations, and did not refer to the fact that the 1987 exchange had not been registered. 
However, India is now seeking to argue that non-registration of a purported treaty precludes its invocation before the 
ICJ. See Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), Verbatim Record of Oral Argument, paras. 16, 66(b) (Int’l. Ct. Justice May 15, 
2017), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-20170515-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf. 
268 Since 1994, the secretary of state has been permitted to determine that publication in the TIAS of certain 
categories of agreement (other than Article II treaties) is not required, if the public interest in such agreements is 
insufficient to justify their publication. In all instances except national security, the secretary of state must provide 
copies of the agreements on request under 1 U.S.C. §112a.  
269 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 725.2 (rev. 2006), available at https://fam.state.gov/default.aspx#. 
270  See supra note 209; current version of decree available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000491782&dateTexte=20170809. The 
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circular of 30 May 1997 provides that, other than in exceptional cases, all accords must be 
published in the Journal Officiel.271  
In the United Kingdom, a statutory crystallization of the Ponsonby rule, introduced in 
2010, now requires that treaties subject to ratification or some equivalent procedure be laid 
before Parliament for twenty-one sitting days, and published in a manner that the relevant 
minister deems appropriate, prior to ratification.272 The publication of treaties not requiring 
ratification or some analogous process is governed by a convention that all such treaties be 
published and laid once they have entered into force.273 This issue received only glancing 
attention in the recent legislative reform process. 274  The government makes occasional 
references to confidential material in treaties or ancillary texts, but often instead frames 
unpublished commitments as non-binding MOUs. In light of ongoing uncertainty about how to 
distinguish between binding treaties and non-binding agreements, and what factors will be given 
most weight,275 use of MOUs entails close attention to both textual indicia276 and negotiating 
strategies.277  
The three democracies examined here are outliers. They are unusually committed to 
publicity of treaties relative to states as a whole. Although numbers of treaties submitted to the 																																																																																																																																																																																		
decree was amended by Decree No 86-707 of Apr. 11, 1986 to incorporate additional requirements regarding 
publication of reservations, interpretive declarations and denunciations. Burdeau, supra note 256, at 852–55. 
271 Circulaire du 30 mai 1997 relative à l’élaboration et à la conclusion des accords internationaux, [1997] 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 8415, available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000200416; see also MAE 
PROTOCOLE/DIRECTION JURIDIQUE/DIRECTION DES ARCHIVES, ACCORDS ET TRAITÉS DE LA FRANCE DE LA 
NÉGOCIATION À LA FIN DE VALIDITÉ 51 (June 2005) (on file with author). 
272 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (UK), s. 20. These requirements may be overridden on a 
minister’s initiative, subject to the treaty being laid and published as soon as possible after ratification. Id., s. 22. 
They do not apply to a specific list of treaties, including some which require express approval of Parliament, and 
others of a more routine nature (e.g., double taxation conventions). Id., s. 23. Additional requirements apply to some 
EU treaties. EU (Amendment) Act 2008; EU Act 2011. 
273 Communication to author from Treaty Section, Legal Directorate, FCO, July 16, 2015.  
274 House of Commons Library, Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, 24–25 (Research Paper 09/73, Oct. 
6, 2009), available at http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP09-73. 
275 On the ICJ’s fluid approach to considerations such as textual indicia, circumstances of negotiation, domestic 
law concerning treaty-making powers, and the (subjective) intention of negotiators, see Chinkin, supra note 7. On 
indicia relevant to the determination of whether a given text is legally binding, see ROBERT KOLB, THE LAW OF 
TREATIES: AN INTRODUCTION 19–20 (2016).  
276 FCO, Legal Directorate, Treaty Section, Treaties and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Guidance on 
Practice and Procedures (2d ed., updated Mar. 2014), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293976/Treaties_and_MoU_Guidanc
e.pdf. Cf. State Department guidance of a similar nature, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/guidance. 
277 In scholarly writing, a former FCO Deputy Legal Adviser has suggested that potential disagreements as to 
status might be headed off with a letter following the conclusion of the MOU. Anthony Aust, Alternatives to Treaty-
Making: MOUs as Political Commitments, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 46, 53 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012). 
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UN  Secretariat for registration do not indicate the proportion of treaties made by each submitter 
which are registered, these numbers do still give some rough sense of engagement with the 
Article 102 obligation. The United States is orders of magnitude ahead of other states in terms of 
the number of treaties submitted. The United Kingdom and France (the latter since the mid-
1960s at least) are also, in relative terms, steady submitters. Other major powers have submitted 
relatively few treaties. The number of treaties submitted by the Russian Federation, for example, 
is actually lower than under the USSR, and the Peoples’ Republic of China, admitted to 
membership in 1971, submitted no treaties until 1985, when it began a modest rate of 
submission.278 Moreover, in many states, domestic law allows governments leeway to make 
treaties without the legislative approval or notification which is a major impetus for publication 
in the states surveyed here.279  
For obvious reasons, it is difficult to describe secret treaties currently in force. Some of 
the secret treaties examined here have been replaced over time. Many early base rights 
agreements have now been renegotiated, for example, as have many of France’s relations with 
former colonies.280 Where secret treaties, or secret ancillary texts, remain, they may take a more 
systematic and detailed form than equivalent treaties in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, commensurate with the increasing functional specialization of transnational relations. 
Taking the United States as an example, it is clear that some classified agreements currently in 
force are iterations of a known genre (such as status of forces agreements, agreements 
concerning base rights, or older “security of information” agreements).281 Others, however, 
might be rather unique arrangements. There is said to be a government-to-government agreement 
between the United States and Pakistan, providing for approval of at least some drone targets by 
Pakistani military and intelligence officials. 282  There seem also to have been written 
arrangements in relation to at least some of the “black sites” controlled by the CIA and used for 																																																								
278 These figures can be gleaned from searches by “Submittor” of the United Nations Treaty Series database, at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/AdvanceSearch.aspx?tab=UNTS&clang=_en. 
279 See survey in Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 23–38 (Duncan B. Hollis, Merrit R. Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington eds., 
2005). 
280  See, e.g., DÉFENSE ET SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE : LE LIVRE BLANC 154 (2008), available at 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/084000341.  
281 For more on secret commitments, albeit not focusing on whether these are legally binding, see Deeks, supra 
note 5. 
282 Michael Hirsh, Pakistan Signed Secret ‘Protocol’ Allowing Drones, NAT’L JOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2013), at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/pakistan-signed-secret-protocol-allowing-drones-20131023. 
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the detention, interrogation and torture of “High Value Detainees” after September 11, 2001.283 
The circumstances surrounding the drafting of these texts remain unknown at this stage. It seems 
difficult to conceive that the “black site” arrangements, in particular, could have been intended to 
be legally binding, yet they were apparently intended to produce some legal effect, however 
attenuated, by managing the relation between legally dubious activity and the public law 
framework in which this activity might be assessed. 
This snapshot of the secret treaty today must also acknowledge the changing role of 
treaties in the larger landscape of interstate interaction. Recourse to MOUs, and the proliferation 
of international organizations, may be moving whole domains of activity out of the realm of 
treaty governance altogether. While international organizations’ own treaty-making has been 
subject to the norm of treaty publication,284 such organizations also offer an alternative means of 
coordinating action. Matters which might once have been agreed in a treaty may now take the 
form of an internal decision, resolution, or policy of an organization or network—and escape the 
norm of publication applicable to treaties altogether.285  
 
VII. THE SURVIVAL OF THE SECRET TREATY: PAST AND FUTURE 	
The history traced here reveals contrasting trends. On one hand, the development of an 
international norm of treaty publication strengthened domestic publication processes. It brought 
into being a centralized (and now digitized, and freely accessible) repository of treaties, featuring 
authenticated texts and translations, thereby enabling tangible instantiations of treaty law as a 
genuinely international corpus. It created a dynamic in which one state’s publication was a 																																																								
283 See, e.g., Affidavit of Józef Pinior (reporting being informed of a “document drawn up under the auspices of 
the government of Leszek Miller for the purpose of regulating the existence of the CIA prison in Poland . . . 
[containing] precise regulations concerning the foundation of the CIA secret prison . . . [and] propos[ing] a protocol 
for action in the event of a prisoner’s death”); and evidence of Mr. JGS [adviser to Senator Marty] (making 
reference to “authorising agreements, which granted extraordinary protections and permissions to the CIA in its 
execution of detainee operations”), as quoted in Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, Judgment, paras. 297, 323 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. July 24, 2014), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-146047"]}; see also DICK MARTY, SECRET 
DETENTIONS AND ILLEGAL TRANSFERS OF DETAINEES INVOLVING COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES: SECOND 
REPORT, at paras. 176–77, 211, 219–20 (June 11, 2007), available at 
https://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/2007/edoc11302.htm (on arrangements with authorities in host 
states). 
284 See supra at note 193; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International 
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Art. 81, UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (Mar. 21, 1986). 
285 This shift intersects also with the rise of “informal law-making.” See, e.g., INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL 
LAWMAKING (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., 2012). 
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matter of legitimate concern to, and discussion in, other states, and made it impossible for 
democracies which wished to uphold the values of the League and United Nations to assert 
baldly that they were making secret treaties. That said, the relationship between publicity and 
legality sketched first in Article 18 of the Covenant has never been wholly realized, either in 
international law or the domestic law of leading democracies. 
 Even if democracies make relatively few secret treaties, the overall workings of treaty-
making offer a contrast with the hopes of 1919. Reformists of the early twentieth century had 
envisaged registration and resulting publicity as marking off a realm of legally binding treaties 
from other possible commitments, grounded in honor or interest, but without legal force. This 
vision has been seriously compromised. The secret treaty remains a viable legal instrument in 
many states, hindered only by an uneven patchwork of domestic law. In the states surveyed here, 
foreign ministries have accepted that published treaties may have secret ancillary texts, the 
relation of which to the principal text is policed with varying degrees of strictness. Secret 
commitments may be channeled outside the register of law altogether, into MOUs. Such MOUs 
may constitute a law-like corpus of obligations, even while not formally legally binding. They 
exist in a sort of parallel system that may not be superior, on rule of law or practical grounds, to 
secret but legally binding treaties. Moreover, secret texts—whether framed as ancillary to the 
published treaty or as MOUs not having legal force themselves—may well shape the 
interpretation of published texts, creating stratifications of knowledge about putatively public 
transactions.  
The gulf between the state of affairs today and the hopes of reformers in 1919 is partly 
the result of short-term interests of governments and institutions pressing against the norm of 
publication and the ideals it was intended to serve. But the history also suggests significant 
complications in the reformists’ vision. If it might broadly be conceded that publicity of treaties 
assisted in democratic control of foreign policy, it became clear that publicity alone was 
insufficient. Meaningful review of treaties required a more sophisticated institutional machinery 
for legislative oversight (something reflected in changing structures and practices in the 
legislatures of many states since WWII). The notion that a norm of publication would foster 
peace, too, was challenged, with secrecy about interstate financial dealings seen as potentially 
fostering peace and stability. Some of the secrecy intended to mask humiliating inequalities of 
negotiating power between states might also be understood as upholding peaceful avenues for 
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interstate interaction. Even with military arrangements, views about the genesis of conflict 
shifted, such that secrecy came to seem not a catalyst for suspicion and belligerence but a 
necessary element of the defense of the existing order. The complexity of any relation between 
publicity and peaceful relations, or at least the avoidance of aggression, is borne out by post-
1945 game-theoretical and strategic approaches to the role of information in the shaping of state 
behavior. 
 As for the imagined relationship between publicity and legality, the basic intuition 
animating Article 18––that legal obligations are, or should be, intrinsically public—was 
countered by the persistence, alongside increasing institutionalization of international law, of a 
voluntarist understanding in which states themselves retained discretion about the forms of their 
legal obligations inter se, and the disclosure of these obligations.  
The relationship between the norm of publication, and the general construction of a law-
governed international order, proved similarly conflicted. On one hand, the forging of a 
centralized corpus of treaty law, and the improvement of national publication practice, seems 
likely to have disseminated and help systematize international law. Moreover, the fact that secret 
treaties were sometimes used to coordinate unlawful, or legally dubious, actions which could not 
have been agreed publicly does support the intuition that a norm of publication would tend to 
bolster the commitment to legality in interstate relations (and, conversely, that violation of the 
norm of publication would tend to undermine legality). Yet many secret treaties do not anticipate 
a violation of law. Secret treaties of this kind may reflect, in a perverse way, faith in the power of 
legal obligations to guide behavior, even in the absence of the mechanisms for institutional 
vindication of rights, and reputational pressure, which usually accompany (public) treaty 
obligations. Episodes like the 1926 dealings with Ethiopia do suggest that the norm of 
publication sometimes fostered a more inclusive, open interstate interaction, vindicating 
sovereign equality, instead of perpetuating hierarchical, self-selecting clubs. However, the 
history given here suggests that a norm of treaty publication may not displace power politics 
even from the limited domain of treaty-making, but rather transpose it onto new procedural 
terrain, favoring parties best able to manipulate the subtleties of drafting.  
Law itself proved resistant to reordering in favor of publicity and double-edged as an 
instrument of transformation toward greater publicity. Legal advisers were often among those 
who upheld strong readings of publicity requirements, and tried to entrench them in bureaucratic 
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practice. Yet the law was not a neutral instrument. Not only was the deep structure of the law of 
treaties resistant to a universal norm of publication, the law of treaties both accommodated, and 
obscured from public view, the preservation of secrecy in more quotidian ways. The 
uncertainties about the outer bounds of the category of “treaty,” coupled with the diplomatic 
craft of drafting layered and fragmented arrangements, offered avenues for secrecy. These 
avenues only multiplied as the scale and extent of treaty-making grew, testing the institutional 
capacities of foreign ministries and legislatures. The technical complexity of the law meant that 
the persistence of secrecy was often opaque to the very legislatures and publics thought to be 
empowered by publicity. More generally, the transmutation of political opposition to “secret 
treaties” into a specific legal discourse steered contestation over the limits of publicity into 
highly technical legal vocabularies, and sapped much of the political impetus and public 
engagement which had initially animated Article 18. 
The foregoing may seem a dismaying conclusion. Not only has legal reform failed to 
eliminate secrecy, but law has in some ways helped sustain secrecy, and legal vocabularies have 
deflected public scrutiny and engagement. However, the historical account provided here does 
not suggest that the ideals initially underpinning Article 18 ought to be abandoned, or that they 
are unattainable. Rather, this history invites new research into the incidence of secrecy in treaty-
making, its effects and implications—but with a more sophisticated understanding than was 
available in 1919 of the architecture of publicity and secrecy, and the economies of knowledge to 
which it gives rise.  
This historical account suggests the importance of domestic law and bureaucratic 
processes of treaty-making in shaping responses to the norm of publication. Secrecy may be 
permitted by domestic law, or negotiated in the interstices of publication requirements, through 
some of the techniques illuminated here. This article has focused on leading liberal democracies. 
The global incidence of secret treaties, and current motivations for secrecy, especially in the 
relations of autocratic or illiberal states, remain to be explored. Secret treaties may be more 
prevalent in illiberal states than among democracies (although, paradoxically, difficulty in 
making credible commitments may require such states to use public and enforceable agreements 
on points of importance). There remain also interesting questions about patterns of secrecy in 
dealings between more and less open states. In many of the interactions surveyed here, the liberal 
democracy has been the more powerful or influential interlocutor, but where roles are reversed, 
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or two states relatively evenly matched, will the publication practices of democratic states 
prevail, despite preferences for secrecy among less open interlocutors?  
Analysis of the effects of secrecy must take account of the complexity of secrecy as a 
phenomenon. Texts are not always sorted into binary categories of “secret” and “published,” but 
arranged into larger transactional complexes. There is sometimes ambiguity, or disagreement 
between the parties, about the legal status of particular texts. Secrecy is not an “all or nothing” 
quality. It sometimes entails strict controls on flows of information, and sometimes a much 
looser arrangement, which does little to prevent information leaking out, but relieves 
governments of the need to detail, or admit, a state of affairs which is widely understood. 
Particular commitments might be entirely unknown to the public, known in their general lines 
but not their specificities, or well-known only to certain segmented audiences (for example, 
foreign intelligence services).  
Once understood in this light, secrecy might have diverse consequences. In circumstances 
where even published treaties are proliferating at a rate that challenges the capacity of 
sophisticated bureaucracies,286 secrecy may affect the likelihood of a treaty ever being fulfilled. 
In other words, some connection between registration and publication, on one hand, and binding 
force, on the other, may operate in practical terms. Conversely, provided a secret text is known to 
relevant personnel, it might shape official actions despite not being processed by foreign 
ministries or included in the corpus of published commitments. Secrecy may have implications 
for the way in which international commitments can be invoked in domestic law, and thus the 
state’s ability to implement undertakings, or to justify its conduct. Secrecy may also play an 
enduring role in the interpretation and evolution of commitments over time. Where secret 
commitments are present, the interpretive process is necessarily opaque (even more so than it 
might be in the case where travaux préparatoires and other material pertinent to interpretation 
are not widely distributed). This may favor the position of the more powerful party, although 
dynamics in particular instances will vary enormously.287 All of this suggests that the effects of 
secrecy in particular cases depend greatly on the institutions and regimes involved, the 
																																																								
286 See, e.g., Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Memorandum Inspection Report. Review of 
Treaty Management Responsibilities in the Office of Treaty Affairs, Report No. ISP-C-05-01, at 2 (Dec. 2004), 
available at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/146709.pdf. 
287 See, e.g., MALLARD, supra note 9 (tracing uses of “transparency,” “ambiguity,” and “opacity” in treaty 
drafting and interpretation); AVNER COHEN, WORST-KEPT SECRET: ISRAEL’S BARGAIN WITH THE BOMB (2010). 
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stratifications of knowledge among different sets of interlocutors, and the dynamics of the 
substance of the treaty.  
Analysis of secrecy’s instrumental effects does not exhaust the intellectual challenge it 
poses. Secrecy is not only a subject of study in its own right, but a revealing window onto some 
larger questions. To return to the theme of the relationship between publicity and legality, 
attention to secrecy calls into question what law is. In stripping legal obligation of its 
institutional and rhetorical accoutrements, it offers glimpses into—often contradictory and 
inchoate—understandings of the nature of legal obligation. It also sharpens normative questions 
about what law should be. Effects of secrecy on, for example, the coherence of the law, or of the 
state as a juridical actor, may be limited by strong centralized oversight of commitments that 
maintains coherence (or at least non-contradiction) between obligations despite the secrecy of 
some texts. But even in such cases, the possibility of secrecy would still call into question, for 
example, the very notion of international law as a knowable corpus of rights and obligations. In 
this respect, attention to the aberrant cases of secrecy has the potential to probe exactly what it is 
about lawful ordering that we find normatively compelling. 
 
